Estimating economic benefits of naval forward presence by Looney, Robert & Schrady, David A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2000
Estimating economic benefits of naval
forward presence
Looney, Robert






Estimating Economic Benefits 





Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for: Chief of Naval Operations, N81 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CA 93943-5000 




This report was prepared for and funded by Chief of Naval Operations, N81, 2000 Navy 
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000. 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
This report was prepared by: 
Reviewed by: 
Associate Chairman for Research 
Department of Operations Research 
ROBERT LOONEY ~ 
Professor of National Security Affairs 
Released by: 
 \tiiA W. NETZER 
Associate Provost and Dean of Research 
Fonn approved 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
OMB No 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORTDATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
October 2000 Technical 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING 
Estimating Economic Benefits of Naval Forward Presence 
6. AUTHOR(S) NOOO3900vJRDR036 
David A. Schrady and Robert Looney 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School 
REPORT NUMBER 
Monterey, CA 93943 }lPS-oR-OI-OO4 
9. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORINGIMONITORING 
Chief of Naval Operations, N816 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AV AlLABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 
This study extends the analysis of the economic benefits of naval crisis response enabled by forward presence 
undertaken by the Naval Postgraduate School for the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR97). That study 
developed an operational methodology for quantifying these benefits. Drawing on that methodology, significant 
economic benefits were found associated with naval crisis response in the Arabian Gulf. The current study expands 
the QDR97 effort in several important directions. First, event analysis is introduced to link naval crisis response 
with price movements in key commodity, exchange, and share markets. Second, several new cases, one not directly 
involving oil, are developed to assess the generality of our findings. The findings of the first study are confmned 
with naval forward presence/crisis response shown to produce extensive economic benefits for the US economy in 
each of the cases examined. Taken together, the two studies suggest that the economic benefits associated with 
naval forward presence/crisis response occur in a wide variety of crisis situations and geographical locations. More 
importantly, increased globalization together with the revival of tight oil markets will, for the foreseeable future, 
only reinforce the economic contributions made by forwardly deployed forces. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
naval forward presence, economic benefits, econometrics 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5800 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
155 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Fonn 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the years, one of the more illusive questions posed to and by the US Navy concerns 
the economic benefits to the United States and allied countries provided by naval forward 
presence and the timely crisis response it enables. While most authorities on the subject contend 
that these benefits are significant, their measurement has always been fraught with conceptual and 
computational difficulties. The greatest difficulty has always involved developing a convincing 
counterfactual argument about what the state of affairs would have been in the absence of 
forward deployed naval forces. 
NPS Studies on the Economic Benefits of Naval Forward Presence 
Our 1997 study of three cases of naval forward presence and crisis response in the Arabian 
Gulf suggested that it is possible to design methodologies capable of quantifying the benefits of 
naval forward presence. More importantly the benefits were shown to be significant in terms of 
their dollar amounts. This study extends our methodology through: (1) the use of additional 
statistical analysis, and (2) the development of four new cases of naval forward presence and 
crisis response. Cases were selected to provide greater geographical diversity and market impact. 
In addition, care was taken to assure that these cases involved primarily naval units, with at best 
limited participation from the other services. 
• The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1996) was selected because of its importance and also the 
fact that it did not appear to involve oil markets. 
• Operation Desert Strike (1996) was chosen to see if a crisis of very short duration 
involving naval forces was capable of altering oil markets in a manner that resulted in 
a significant impact on the United States economy. 
• Operation Desert Fox (1998) was selected because it represents a case where there 
was great uncertainty in oil markets concerning both Iraq's intentions and the 
consequences of naval actions. 
• Libyan Operations (1986) was chosen because it occurred at a time in which oil 
markets were first developing sophisticated forward markets. Also represents a case 
close to Europe and thus possible links to exchange and share markets. 
Main Findings 
The study produced a number of significant findings: 
• As in the first study, all cases are shown to produce positive economic benefits for 
the United States economy. These benefits, measured in 1995 US dollars, are non-
trivial with each operation yielding well over a billion dollars in terms of added 
Gross Domestic Product to the US economy. 
• Also similar to the first study, the oil markets provide a consistent link between naval 
actions and the US economy. This occurs despite the fact that in one case, the Taiwan 
Strait incident of 1996, it is not apparent that oil markets would be affected. 
• While oil markets were the one constant throughout the cases, several other markets 
are affected by naval actions. These include: the dollar/yen exchange rate, the CRB 
commodity index, the Goldman-Sachs Commodity Index, the S&P-l00, the NIKKEI 
225, the Hang-Seng, and the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. 
• More importantly, naval actions have a positive effect. In each case involving oil, 
naval actions reduce the price from what it would have been in the absence of 
forward presence and crisis response. In the case of share markets and the dollar/yen 
exchange rate, prices are higher than they would have been if naval forces had not 
been present. 
• In affecting these markets, naval actions are shown to produce a short-run (overnight 
effect) in the directions noted above. More importantly the analysis found that the 
impact of naval actions on these markets lingers for a significant time, altering prices 
for a period of time that allows for significant benefits to the United States economy. 
• With regards to globalization, naval actions are seen to complement the positive 
impact that increased globalization has had on the US economy. In addition, it is 
argued that naval forward presence and crisis response tended to strengthen the 
process of globalization through providing stability and security for markets. 
Summary and Implications 
Summing up, the study's findings confirm and reinforce our original findings as to the 
significant and positive economic impacts associated with naval forward presence and crisis 
response. We have now examined seven cases and in each found benefits of at least a billion 
dollars (over $50 billion in the Gulf War) to the United States economy. Furthermore, these 
effects were found to occur in a variety of situations and over a long period of time. More 
importantly the statistical findings presented here confirm many of the educated guesses made in 
that earlier study concerning the links between naval actions, markets and the US economy. 
As for the future, these findings combined with likely developments in oil, securities and 
foreign exchange markets, together with trends in globalization suggest that the Navy's forward 
presence is more than likely to produce similar if not increased economic benefits to the United 
States economy in the years to come. Increased integration of markets should aid in transmitting 
the Navy's stabilizing effect on markets, while naval presence should aid in speeding up the 




This study was in large part a joint effort with a number of students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School making significant contributions to the preliminary work as well as the final 
report. 
The study started as a class project (NS-4141, Economic Intelligence) during the Winter 
2000 term. While all of the class participants made significant inputs to the discussion of issues 
and the conceptual problems involved in the study, several made contributions that have been 
included in and greatly enhance the final report. These include: 
• LT Francisco Martinez, USN, developed the time lines and background material for 
the Taiwan Strait, Desert Strike and Desert Fox cases. In addition he provided event 
scoring for these cases along with that for the Attain Document I Case 
• LT Michael Hobaugh, USN, examined the manner in which Maritime insurance rates 
are set. Difficulties associated with this data appear in Appendix H. In addition he 
has laid the groundwork for further research in the area though identifying a number 
of leading authorities in the field. 
• LT Timothy Sullivan, USN, developed the time line, event scoring and background 
for the Attain Document I, as well as the other cases comprising the Libyan 
operations of 1986). He also provided event scores for these operations. 
• L T William Sutton, USN, provided the background for our assessment of piracy 
issues in Appendix I. 
• Major Juergen Merrath, German Air Force, and LTCOL Ivo Musil, Czech Republic 
Army, wrote contrasting papers on the implications for the naval forward presence of 
trends in globalization. These comprise the bulk of the discussion of globalization 
issues in the study. 
• Major Milan Divorak, Czech Republic Army, did some of the preliminary event 
analysis runs and made suggestions to improve the conceptual validity of the 
approach. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the years one of the more illusive questions posed to and by the Navy concerns the 
economic benefits to the United States and allied countries provided by u.S. Naval forward 
presence. Forward presence enables timely crisis response. While most authorities on the subject 
contend that these benefits are significant, their measurement has always been fraught with 
conceptual and computational difficulties. The greatest difficulty has always involved developing 
a convincing counterfactual argument about what the state of affairs would have been in the 
absence of timely crisis response by forward-engaged naval forces. 
1.1 Background 
The issue came to the fore in preparing for the Congressionally-mandated 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Early in the QDR preparations, Navy leaders asked if the 
economic benefits of forward-engaged naval forces could be quantified and thereby 
communicated to policy makers. Until this point, the only evidence of such benefits was 
anecdotal (System Planning Corporation 1996). The Naval Postgraduate School was tasked to 
develop new methodologies directed toward the quantification of these benefits. 
The methodology ultimately developed focused on the effect of naval forward presence and 
crisis response on world oil prices, as reflected by oil futures markets (Naval Postgraduate School 
1997). Using a vector autoregression econometric model, the approach then linked the oil price 
effects associated with naval forward presence and crisis response to changes in major economic 
indicators. 
1.2 Findings in the Previous Study 
This methodology was then applied to three cases of naval crisis response: the opening 
stages of Desert Shield (1990 Gulf War); the Iraq-Kuwait border incident of October 1994; and 
the January 1987 Gulf Shipping Crisis. These crises varied in terms of the military threat posed 
to U.S. and allied interests, oil market conditions, business cycles and the general world economic 
climate, but a clear trend emerged from the analysis of each incident. When oil futures markets 
become aware of naval crisis response, oil prices decline. 
By stabilizing and lowering prices in oil futures markets during these crises, naval crisis 
response provided significant benefits to the U.S. economy. These benefits are measured in terms 
of dollar losses that would have occurred in the absence of naval crisis response. Conservative 
estimates indicate that naval crisis response in the opening stages of Desert Storm provided 
$55.22 billion (1997 dollars) worth of economic benefits (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) to the 
United States. Similarly, naval crisis response during the 1994 Iraq-Kuwait border incident 
yielded $7.13 billion (1997 dollars) in benefits, while naval crisis response during the 1987 Gulf 
Shipping Crisis produced $5.01 billion (1997 dollars) in benefits. Naval crisis response not only 
had a positive impact on the U.S. economy, but also on the economy of America's allies. Naval 
crisis response in the opening states of Desert Storm alone is likely to have provided up to a 
$86.80 billion (1997 dollars) increase in world income (GDP). 
To summarize, several major findings emerged from this research: 
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• Most important, it is possible to develop procedures to quantitatively measure some 
of the economic impacts of naval crisis response. 
• Economic impacts can be measured in terms of dollar cost savings and or additional 
dollar resources available to the economy. 
• These economic impacts can be significant. They may also persist over a fairly long 
time period and across the economies of a large number of US allies. 
• While these initial estimates of the economic benefits associated with naval crisis 
response are high, it is apparent that they underestimate the complete benefits 
associated with crisis response. One can simply not put a hard figure on the benefits 
from the many crises no doubt prevented by the mere forward presence of the Navy. 
The study concluded that economic benefits associated with naval forward presence in the 
Gulf region would most likely outweigh the costs associated with these operations. Albeit 
without hard analysis, it was concluded that in the future, given the nature of oil markets, naval 
forward presence probably would continue to yield significant economic gains. 
The FY97 study has been widely circulated and critiqued, and the economic analysis 
described above has been well received. The methodology developed and applied to the Desert 
Storm case has been accepted for publication in the professional peer-reviewed academic journal 
Interfaces. 
1.3 Relevance for the Current Study 
As is the case with most first attempts, the NPS Report has distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. The strength of the analysis lies in its analytical methodology linking naval crisis 
response to movements in oil futures prices. This linkage creates a credible counterfactual 
argument of what oil prices would likely be in the absence of naval intervention. While there are 
still several conceptual problems to be resolved (mainly relating to other factors that might 
influence oil prices), these linkages have withstood detailed scrutiny. The weaknesses of the 
study include a relatively small sample of cases taken from one, albeit important, region of the 
world. In addition, given time constraints, other markets (exchange rates, commodity markets 
and the like) that might also have been affected by naval movements (thUS providing additional 
benefits to the U.S. economy) were not systematically examined. 
The current study was undertaken to address these limitations while, at the same time 
strengthening, and extending our basic methodology. Specifically in the first study: 
• The links between naval movements and oil prices were largely inferred from the 
movements in oil spot rates together with movements in the gap between the first and 
second forward contract (a standard measure of the market's assessment of risk). 
While this approach is on solid theoretical ground, one might argue that one or more 
other events associated with the crisis were responsible for these price movements. 
To overcome this limitation, the current study takes all of the events (naval and non-
naval) surrounding a crisis and tests them econometrically to determine their 
statistical association with oil prices. 
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•. Event analysis is also used to test different hypotheses concerning the market's 
response to announced naval movements. Specifically we test the alternative view 
commonly held that naval movements generate concern over potential conflicts in a 
region, thus precipitating oil price increases. That hypothesis is conclusively shown 
to be false. 
• While the earlier study found strong linkages between naval movements and oil 
prices, one might argue these associations were simply overnight effects. Given the 
volatility of commodity markets, naval crisis response impacts could be quickly 
reversed thus producing little in the way of a long-term impact on economic activity 
in the United States. While our use of forward markets overcame this criticism, we 
have extended the analysis even further in an attempt to statistically verify the 
existence of long-run price movements resulting from naval crisis response. 
• To this end, the current study uses a relatively new econometric technique, 
cointegration analysis, to test for long-run associations. Specifically, is there an 
association between naval events and markets that tends to modify the movement of 
prices over long periods of time? Are these periods sufficiently long so that naval 
events have a significant impact on economic activity in the United States? The 
analysis clearly shows that both are the case. 
• As noted above, given time limitations, the initial study focused exclusively on oil 
markets. Certainly there are number crises in regions where oil markets are not 
seemingly involved. The issue is whether there are other markets or indirect effects 
on oil markets that naval events might impact that are capable of ultimately 
producing non-trivial benefits for the US economy? The current study extends the 
first by systematically introducing other commodity markets, exchange rates and 
share markets into the analysis. 
• The cases in the original study were all drawn from the Arabian Gulf. Here the issue 
is whether or not this biased the conclusions drawn. Is the Gulf unique to the extent 
that few generalizations can be drawn for other parts of the world? To address this 
issue several cases outside the Gulf were selected: the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 
and the Libyan crisis of early 1986. 
• Finally, the first study focused on individual cases without assessing the extent to 
which changing world economic conditions, globalization and the like might alter the 
outcome if similar events occurred in the future. To overcome this limitation the 
current study examines the links between naval forward presence and crisis response, 
and globalization. The issues examined include whether current trends in 
globalization strengthen or weaken the economic impacts associated with naval 
forward presence and crisis response? Does naval forward presence affect the 
economic environment associated with a particular state of globalization? Are naval 
forward presence and likely changes in globalization likely to aid or stifle economic 
growth in the United States? 
As noted, the current study examines four additional cases to assess the extent to which the 
findings of our first study can be generalized. The cases were chosen to provide greater 
geographical diversity. In addition, care was taken to assure that these cases involved primarily 
naval units, with at best limited participation from the other services. 
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• The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1996) was selected because of its importance and also the 
fact that it did not appear to involve oil markets. 
• Operation Desert Strike (1996) was chosen to see if a crisis of very short duration 
involving naval forces was capable of altering oil markets in a manner that resulted in 
a significant impact on the United States economy. 
• Operation Desert Fox (1998) was selected because it represents a case where there 
was great uncertainty in oil markets concerning both Iraq's intentions and the 
consequences of naval actions. 
• Libyan Operations (1986) was chosen because it represented a time in which oil 
markets were first developing sophisticated forward markets. Also represents a case 
close to Europe and thus possible links to exchange and share markets. 
The next chapter describes the methodology developed in this study. That methodology 
is then applied to the analysis of the four cases described above. Chapter VII examines 
globalization and naval forward presence. A summary of the study's principal findings is 




The methodology used in the current study draws on and extends that developed in our 
earlier work (Naval Postgraduate School 1997). The main difficulties in estimating the economic 
benefits derived from naval forward presence and crisis response is in establishing a credible 
counterfactual argument as well as a meaningful measure of impact. Specifically, what would 
have been the state of the United States economy if naval forces had not responded to the crisis at 
hand? Given that naval forces did respond, what is the relevant measure to capture the economic 
impact associated with this response? 
11.2 Conceptual Issues 
Both problems are fraught with a number of conceptual issues that need to be resolved 
before the calculation of economic benefits can be undertaken. First, by their nature, crises tend 
to have a negative impact on markets and economic activity. Forward-engaged naval forces are 
often the first to respond to a crisis and their arrival on scene usually has a stabilizing political 
influence. The stabilizing influence extends to economic activity as well. As noted in the 
Introduction and based on our first study, oil appears to be the most tractable vehicle for 
analyzing the economic benefit of naval forward presence and crisis response. Because oil is 
essential to nearly all-economic activity in the industrialized world, price movements of that 
commodity in reaction to world events provide a useful index of the overall economic impact of 
international crises, and of the response of naval forces to them. 
Second, it is essential to select an index capable of reflecting the market's interpretation of 
the severity of a crisis as well as the degree to which trader confidence is restored following the 
response of naval forces to a crisis. Because oil futures prices provide more information than 
spot prices, this study uses futures prices to explore the effect of naval forward presence and 
crisis response. Oil futures markets serve as an efficient substitute for the bulk storage of oil. 
Instead of stockpiling oil reserves, futures markets such as the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) allow companies to purchase contracts to buy or sell oil at some future time. These 
contracts are transacted for individual months in the future. Traders base their offers on the best 
economic, political, and military information available to them at the time the contract is traded. 
As a result, futures prices are considered to be the best-unbiased estimate of the likely spot or 
daily price of oil when the contracted delivery date actually arrives [Bopp 1991]. 
11.3 The Use of Futures Markets 
Futures transactions generate oil price forecasts that reflect traders' confidence that oil 
will be readily available at some future point in time. Futures prices can thus be used to assess 
the effects of naval forward presence and crisis response on market confidence in oil availability. 
Perhaps more importantly for purposes of this study, the use of futures markets allows the effects 
of naval crisis response on oil markets to be isolated from those caused by other events. 
The broad outline of the study methodology is to track futures oil prices, observe the 
increase in prices caused by a crisis and the reduction and stabilization of the prices when naval 
forces arrive on scene. This generates an estimate of the value of the crisis response of naval 
5 
forces in terms of the price paid for oil. Furthermore, when used as an input to econometric 
models, futures prices can be used to compute the long-term effects on economic activity in the 
United States and other world economies. 
11.3.1 Identification of Market Anticipations 
The notional pattern is assumed to be as follows. Prior to a crisis, oil futures market curves 
generally slope upward as shown in Figure 1, Curve 1. Curve 1 reflects both the cost of storage 
and the general expectation among traders that oil prices will increase over time. With the advent 
of a crisis, however, future availability of oil is in doubt and traders attach an uncertainty 
premium to there ask price [Gabilon 1995J. The effect on futures prices is twofold. First, such a 




Notional Relationship Between Naval Crisis Response and Oil Futures Markets 
Crisis Effect 
(1) Pre-Crisis Futures Price Profile 
(2) Immediate Post-Crisis Profile 
(3) Initial Price Profile Following 
Naval Crisis Response 
(4) Profile After Markets Equilibrate 
Months Until Contra::ted Daivery 
Second, the slope of the futures market curve becomes negative (Figure 1, Curve 2), reflecting 
traders' willingness to pay a premium for immediate possession of oil. When naval forces 
respond to the crisis, some of the uncertainty concerning oil supplies is alleviated, which shifts 
the futures price curve downward and decreases the short-run premium paid for immediate 
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possession of oil. These effects are evidenced by a downward shift and flattening of the futures 
price schedule (Figure 1, Curve 3). Overtime, naval forward presence reduces risk to oil supplies 
and alleviates traders' concerns over oil availability. Increasing confidence in oil supplies can be 
seen graphically by a further flattening of the futures price curve (Figure 1, Curve 4). 
11.3.2 Calculation of Economic Benefits 
In the analysis that follows, futures prices are used to compute two different measures of 
the benefits derived from naval crisis response. First, potential savings in oil import bills alone 
are estimated by mUltiplying the differential between the higher prices caused by the crisis and 
the prices moderated by naval crisis response by the amount of oil imported during the period that 
begins with the onset of the crisis and ends when markets stabilize. A second, far larger measure 
is the effect of lower oil prices over time as they spread through the economy affecting 
production, employment, inflation and more. 
These much larger effects on economic aCtivIty in the United States and other world 
powers are estimated through the application of a class of econometric models originally 
developed by Christopher Sims of Northwestern University in the early 1980s [Sims 1980]. In 
Figure 2, the box labeled 'Vector Autoregression Econometric Model' (VAR) refers to a model 
for the United States economy developed for the current study along the lines of the original 
Sims' estimation framework. The short-term oil price effects associated with naval crisis 
response are the difference between curves 2 and 3 in Figure 1, and they become part of the input 
data for Sims' model to estimate short-term economic benefits. For long-term economic benefits, 
the difference between curves 2 and 4 in Figure 1 is used instead, since curve 4 represents the 
futures prices after a new eqUilibrium has been established. 
Summing up, the actual steps used in computing the economic benefits of naval crisis 
response are outlined in Figure 2. Using the various NYMEX oil future prices from Figure 1 as 
inputs to the model of the United States economy (V AR), the likely level of GDP and key 
components under each set of prices is calculated. The differential between the resulting GDP 
scenarios (based on the sets of prices noted in the previous paragraph) is interpreted as the effect 
(avoidance of lost income/GDP) brought about by the naval crisis response. 
When compared with an examination of oil spot prices, the methodology developed here, 
which is based on futures prices, better captures the true effects of naval forward presence and 
crisis response. Relying solely on spot prices may lead to a conclusion that naval forces produce 
a price effect that is only temporary and of little economic significance. In reality, naval forward 
presence and crisis response alters key price· structures months into the future. Because oil 
futures prices, as used in this analysis, provide considerably more information about the response 
of oil markets to naval activity than do spot prices, this methodology captures larger, longer-term 








Methodological Overview: Steps in Computing the Economic Benefits 
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II. 4 Model Extensions in Current Study 
The steps noted above comprised the core of the approach used in our initial study and 
provide the key building blocks for the current effort. ~pecifically, the present study extends this 
approach in several key areas. Using the method outlined above one still has great difficulty in 
making a convincing argument that changes in oil prices or other key economic variables during a 
period of crisis were due in large part to the movement of naval forces from forward presence 
positions. Even though in our earlier cases in the Gulf a clear pattern seemed to exist between 
crisis response and oil price movement, the strongest arguments making this link had to rely 
largely on the process of elimination; i.e., no other credible events could have produced the 
observed pattern of oil prices. 
A second problem is that naval forward presence and crisis response analysis has focused 
almost exclusively on oil markets. Clearly however, other markets concerned with safety of 
supplies, access to raw materials, future economic conditions and the like must also be affected to 
one extent or another by the movement of naval forces at critical junctures. To overcome these 
limitations the current study incorporates several new elements: 
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11.4.1 Additional Markets 
With increased globalization and the increased interlinking of markets, it is clear that naval 
actions are likely to affect exchange rates, share values, and a whole host of related commodity 
indexes. Associated movements in these markets are also likely to impact on the US economy. 
Specifically, associated movements in one or more of these markets may enhance the positive 
impacts of naval actions or, conversely, offset the oil derived benefits. For example although 
naval crisis response often lowers oil prices, it may simultaneously weaken the yen, providing 
Japanese exporters with a competitive edge in the US market. Subsequently, increased imports 
and associated loss of jobs could conceivably offset all of the benefits derived from lower oil 
prices. 
The current study therefore extends the basic oil model outlined above by incorporating 
movements of several key foreign exchange rates (the forward values of the yen, mark and 
pound) into the analysis. Also included are several key commodity futures indexes, the CRB 
commodity index and the Goldman-Sachs commodity index. Finally, several key share markets, 
the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index, the S&Pl00, the FTSE, the Nikkei and the 
Hang Seng are also included in the analysis. 
11.4.2 Event Analysis 
The second major extension of our earlier model was to design a method for statistically 
linking naval actions and other events to price movements in key markets. As noted above, our 
earlier study made this key connection largely through the process of elimination. Event analysis 
provides a true statistical test of the association of naval actions and markets. It also can be used 
for hypothesis testing. Specifically, do naval actions increase market uncertainty or do they 
provide a stabilizing impact? Do naval actions produce only a transitory movement in market 
prices or are these actions responsible for longer run adjustments in these markets? If the latter is 
the case, the credibility of the forward market analysis outlined above is strengthened in that the 
consequences of naval actions are not confined to the short-run up-and-down fluctuations of spot 
prices. Instead, these actions actually set in motion a whole series of economic adjustments that, 
taken as a whole, provide significant economic benefits. 
Basically, event analysis consists of coding events (actions, key developments) with a 
subjective evaluation of their likely consequences. In this study we have used a scale of -3 to +3 
to characterize individual actions. For example if events clearly relieve tension and reduce the 
chance of open conflict in the region, they would be given a score of -3. On the other hand, 
provocative incidents would receive a +3. If it is unclear what the consequences of an event 
might have been, several hypothesis can be tested. In short, rather than speculating as to the 
manner in which markets actually perceived the event, alternative specifications can be tested to 
determine which scoring system best depicts the manner in which markets reflected the 
significance attributed by traders to naval and non-naval events. 
For example, in the Taiwan Strait case examined below, naval forces account for two 
important events-December 19, 1995 when the USS Nimitz Battle Group crossed the Taiwan 
Straits for the first time since 1979 and March 22, 1996 when the USS Nimitz Battle Group again 
arrived in the vicinity of Taiwan. One school of thought contends that both events heightened 
tensions in the region, thus elevating oil and other affected market prices. Another school of 
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thought contends that both events, by showing US resolve to defend Taiwan actually defused 
tensions, thus causing a drop in affected prices. Using both positive and negative signs for these 
two dates one can statistically test for the interpretation that best fits the facts. For the case at 
hand, it is clear from the analysis below that the second interpretation is the correct one. 
Statistically, several regression-type techniques can be used to conduct an event analysis. 
The ones chosen here are described at length by Pesaran & Pesaran (1997). The first technique, 
the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure, is used to compute maximum likelihood estimators 
under the assumption that the regression disturbances follow an autoregressive (AR) process. 
This particular procedure is useful because it corrects for serial correlation (correlation of the 
error terms), thus producing superior estimates to those usually associated with least-squares 
regression. This technique is used to assess short-run movements that clearly do not have a long-
run component. For example several tests are undertaken to determine which events (naval or 
non-naval) are responsible for the uncertainty in key markets as measured by the spread between 
the first and second contract (the contract for oil to be delivered next month and the contract for 
the second month from now). Do naval events create uncertainty thus increasing the spread, or do 
they provide stability and assurance of supplies thus reducing the spread? 
11.4.3 Shock and Long-Term Adjustment Analysis 
To test for long-run associations between naval actions and key markets we adapted 
Pesaran & Pesaran's autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration. This 
technique has been applied (Looney 2000, Looney and Frederiksen 2000) to a wide variety of 
research problems involving shocks and longer run adjustments. If two variables, say the 
NYMEX oil price and Brent oil price, establish a long-run pattern with each other they are said to 
be cointegrated. Short-run shocks can disrupt the pattern. However these shocks simultaneously 
set off an adjustment process restoring the historical pattern. For example if there was a long-run 
pattern between the NYMEX and Brent markets, a sudden jump in the Brent price due perhaps 
from a disaster in the North Sea, prices in the NYMEX market would gradually increase to 
restore the original longer-run pattern. 
In our example, oil prices on anyone date can therefore be said to reflect two forces-the 
long-run adjustment to a normal pattern and a short-run movement in response to an event 
shocking the system. Technically, any change in price will reflect, to one extent or another, these 
short and long-run components. 
11.4.3.1 The ARDL Approach to Cointegration 
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration is used extensively 
below for several reasons. First, the procedure establishes a fairly strict and unambiguous set of 
criteria for selecting the appropriate lag structures. Specifically, the analysis embodies several 
summary statistics that can be used to determine if the appropriate lag between an event and its 
impact is one, two or even more days. This useful feature takes a lot of the guesswork out of 
relying on visual charts to determine the pattern. Second, the technique allows us to go beyond 
the day-to-day fluctuations in prices to assess the longer-term ripple effects associated with a 
crisis. Clearly, if an event increases prices one day and in tum prices fall the next, the event may 
appear to have little consequence in terms of economic costs or benefits. On the other hand if this 
shock carries over to a series of longer-term adjustments, the event can have considerable costs 
(or benefits). The ARDL approach was designed to identify the occurrence of this type of 
phenomenon. 
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11.4.3.2 An Example 
These points can be best illustrated with a typical example from one of the cases. Using the 
timeline from the Taiwan Strait case, naval and other events over the period from December 1, 
1995 to April 2, 1996 are coded on a scale of +3 to -3 (Appendix B) depending on their 
anticipated impact on NYMEX oil prices. Here, several sets of codes are logical. EVENT3 
assumes a favorable response (downward pressure on oil prices) from each of the naval events. 
As a basis of comparison and hypothesis testing, the series, EVENT3A, is constructed on 
the assumption that the initial naval event on December 19 destabilized oil markets (resulting in a 
price increase that day). However, the March 22, 1966 event involving the Nimitz retained its 
value of (-3). In constructing the series EVENT3B, both naval events receive a positive score on 
the hypothesis that markets treated these events as the prelude to increased tension and 
uncertainty. Finally, in constructing the scores for EVENT3C, all events, naval and non-naval 
receive a positive score on the assumption that they destabilize oil markets. 
To determine which set of assumptions (EVENT3, EVENT3A, EVENT3B or EVENT3C) 
best depicts the manner in which oil market traders interpreted the events during this period, the 
ARDL regression fonnulation noted above was undertaken four times (one for each of the 
EVENT series). The outcome when EVENT3 set of assumptions was assumed to be the relevant 
depiction of market sentiment produced an equation of the fonn: 
(1) LWYMEXS = -89.8 MNTP + 0.7LlliRENTS + 13.5 dEVENT3(-1) - 0.6 ecm(-1) 
(-1.06) (6.29) (2.33) (-6.37) 
where NYMEXS is the NYMEX spot rate, BRENTS is the Brent spot rate, EVENT3 is the 
various naval and non-naval events from the time line, INTP is the intercept tenn and ecm is the 
error correction mechanism. ~ is the variable's change from the previous period and (-1) is the 
variable lagged one period. Tenns in parentheses below the equation are the t-ratio (regression 
coefficient divided by the standard error) for the associated variable. The t-ratio for each variable 
indicates that all variables except the equation intercept tenn (MNTP) are statistically significant 
at the 95% level of confidence. The ecm tenn itself has the fonn: 
ecm = NYMEXS + 155.4INTP - 1. 1 BRENTS - 23.37 EVENT3 
The equations are interpreted as follows. 
• During this period the NYMEX market fonned a long-run pattern with the BRENT 
market and the EVENT3 tenn (evidenced by the statistical significance of the ecm 
tenn). 
• In the short-run, movement in either the BRENT or EVENT3 tenn set off a shock that 
disrupted the long-run pattern of the three variables. 
• In this example, naval events have a negative sign (assumed to reduce oil prices) in the 
ecm. It follows that a naval event would lower oil prices in the short-tenn (given the 
positive sign on the EVENT3 tenn). 
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• Following a shock (that, for instance, raises the price of oil in the short-run), the ecm 
term (with its negative sign) begins to pull that price downward until its long-run 
pattern with the other two variables is restored. 
• The speed of this adjustment is proportional to the gap between the NYMEX, Brent 
markets and the EVENT3 term (the negative signs on the Brent and EVENT3 terms in 
the ecm). The coefficient on the ecm term controls the speed of adjustment with 0.6 
being a relatively large term (the term varies from 0 to 1). 
• Since naval events have a negative sign in the EVENT3 term and that term in turn has a 
negative sign in the ecm, naval events increase the size of the ecm term. 
• In turn, the ecm has a negative sign in the NYMEXS equation. Naval events therefore 
are seen as an element that tends to reduce NYMEX prices over time. 
Summing up the Taiwan Strait example, the event variables are designed to vary largely 
based on the weights attached to the two major naval events: the first was on December 19, 1995, 
when the USS Nimitz Battle Group crossed the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 1979 and 
the second was on March 22, 1996 when the USS Nimitz Battle Group again arrived in the 
vicinity of Taiwan. In the EVENT3 variable, both naval events have negative signs (-2 for the 
first and -3 for the second). Here, the hypothesis is that each would have a stabilizing effect on 
oil prices, lowering the spot and forward rates. Event variable EVENT3A changes the December 
19 naval event to +2 (leaving March 22 at -3), while event variable EVENT3B assigns +2 and +3 
to the respective naval events; i.e., naval events would contribute to the increase in oil price. In 
EVENT3C all of the event variables, naval and non-naval, have a positive sign. 
Based on these event codings, the results for the all the event variables are shown in Table 
1. Note that the statistical significance of the event variable (as indicated by the t-ratio) declines 
as we move from the assumption that naval actions stabilize markets to the assumption that naval 
actions increase uncertainty and destabilize markets. The assumption that all events, naval and 
non-naval, destabilize oil markets (EVENT3C) has the lowest statistical significance of the four 
depictions. Given the sample size and degrees of freedom, any t-ration value over 2.0 (absolute 
value) is significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that naval 
events played a stabilizing, rather than destabilizing, role in oil markets during this particular 
crisis. 
lIS Conclusions 
The methods used to extend our earlier research on the economic effects of naval forward 
presence should lend increased credibility to that approach. While theoretically correct, our 
earlier work still relied on several subjective assessments at critical steps. These limitations have 
been addressed through the inclusion of additional markets and regions, as well as the rigor of 
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Notes: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates ARDL( 1) with d = change from previous period; 
(-1) lagged one period; Coefficient = un standardized regression coefficient. The results are 
presented in three representations; (1) the standard regression presentation; (2) the long-run 
coefficients; and (3) the error correction format. 
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III. Case I: The Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996 
111.1 Introduction 
In March 1996 the most serious confrontation in the Taiwan Strait since the 1958 Kinmen 
crisis occurred. China deployed some 150,000 troops in Fujian Province bordering the strait, and 
conducted three consecutive military exercises in the areas near Taiwan. These included missile 
tests close to Keelung and Kaohsiung, Taiwan's two most important seaports; a live-ammunition 
military exercise, and a large-scale amphibious landing exercise. . 
Taiwan was on high alert during this period. The United States became involved 
immediately, sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area near Taiwan to monitor 
Chinese military actions. This was the largest naval movement by the United States in the Asia-
Pacific region since the Vietnam War (Porch 1999). 
These actions constituted the first potential military confrontation between the two 
countries since the normalization of relations after President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. 
Cross-strait tension rose quickly and dramatically and there was widespread fear that China's 
military exercises might turn into military actions against Taiwan or that accidents might trigger 
conflict in such a tense situation. 
111.2 Timeline 
The main events of the crisis are as follows: 
August 23. 1995 
Lee Teng-hui announces his candidacy for president in the March 1996 election. Beijing's 
Xinhua (New China) News Agency calls on "all the Chinese people" to sweep Lee "into 
the dustbin of history." 
December 19. 1995 
USS Nimitz battle group crosses the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 1979. 
January 23. 1996 
The New York Times reports China plans to attack Taiwan after the island's presidential 
elections March 23. China has no comment on the report. 
January 24. 1996 
Beijing denies the New York Times report that Beijing has completed plans for a limited 
military attack on Taiwan. A Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses the report as "totally 
groundless" and declines to comment further. 
February 9, 1996 
China begins moving about 150,000 troops to a coastline facing Taiwan. China also 
reinforces its air strength with 88 warplanes to reach a total number of 226 aircraft 
deployed at 11 airports along 250 miles of coastline in its southeastern Fujian Province. 
They also deploy four amphibious landing craft -- two in the Fujian port of Xiamen (3.75 
14 
miles from the Taiwan-controlled island of Kinmen) and two at Pingtan (island near 
Taiwan-controlled Matsu island). 
February 12, 1996 
Taiwan's Defense Ministry says China is massing up to 150,000 troops for large-scale 
exercises near Taiwan. 
February 23, 1996 
Taiwanese presidential candidate Peng Ming-min warns China that if it occupies so much 
as one inch of Taiwan's territory, he will immediately formally declare Taiwan's 
independence. 
February 28, 1996 
The U.S. Export-Import Bank complies with Secretary of State Warren Christopher's 
request to stop financing any deals in China over the next 30 days while the 
Administration decides whether it will impose sanctions against Beijing for selling 
nuclear technology to Pakistan. 
March 5, 1996 
China's official Xinhua News Agency reports that the People's Liberation Army will 
stage a series of missile exercises just off Taiwan's coast from March 8 to 15. Xinhua 
says the training exercises will involve surface-to-surface missiles in two areas: one site 
northeast of Taiwan, about 21 miles from Keelung port, the other 32 miles west of the 
southern port of Kaohsiung. By using two sites 250 miles apart, China apparently wants 
to show it can coordinate a complex, large-scale operation and block Taiwan's ports. 
Foreign ships and aircraft are advised to stay clear of the test sites. The 40-member 
House Republican Policy Committee issues a written statement rejecting the Clinton 
Administration's ambiguity on the q'uestion of whether the US would defend Taiwan if it 
comes under attack from China. The statement says the US should commit itself "to the 
defense of Taiwan" and work to deter China from "invading, attacking, or blockading 
Taiwan." 
March 8, 1996 
At intervals of roughly an hour, three M-9 ballistic missiles carrying dummy warheads 
splash down into target areas just 22 miles from Keelung, the island's second busiest 
seaport, and 32 miles from the harbor of Kaohsiung, the third largest container port in the 
world. These two ports are the closest to the Chinese target zones, and account for 70 
percent of Taiwan's two-way trade. China also stages elaborate military maneuvers in a 
6,600-square-mile rectangle that stretches to the mid-point of the Taiwan Strait. The area 
is 30 to 70 miles from Taiwanese Islands. Beijing also says it plans to begin "live 
ammunition" war games on March 12 in a 6,000-square-mile zone that will obstruct 
much of the shipping and air traffic in the Taiwan Strait. 
March 9, 1996 
China's People's Liberation Army announces live-fire naval and air force exercises at the 
south end of the Taiwan Strait from March 12-20. 
March 10, 1996 
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls China's attempt to intimidate Taiwan 
"reckless," and announces the dispatch of a battle group led by the USS Independence. 
He says, "I think they've been risky, and ... smack of intimidation and coercion." The 
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destroyer USS Hewitt and guided-missile frigate USS McClusky will join the 
Independence north of Taiwan the following day,according to the Seventh Fleet from 
Yokosuka, Japan. The guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill takes up a position south 
of the island to monitor China's missile tests, according to the Navy. Secretary 
Christopher says on NBC's Meet the Press that the U.S. intends the warships to be "in a 
position to be helpful, if they need to be." 
March 11. 1996 
1996 President Clinton orders a second US carrier battle group into the area, and the 
Pentagon shifts a carrier already there closer to Taiwan. The naval battle group led by the 
USS Independence, stationed about 200 miles off Taiwan's shores the week before to 
monitor China's ballistic missile exercises, has moved to within about 100 miles. It 
remains outside the Strait of Taiwan. Secretary of Defense William Perry says the 
movement of U.S. warships is "a prudent, cautionary measure." 
March 12, 1996 
China launches war games southwest of Taiwan, drawing a Taiwanese threat to strike 
back if the mock warfare turns into an attack. Chinese combat planes and warships 
practice bombing runs and drills off Taiwan at the start of eight days of war games. 
About 10 Chinese ships conduct formation drills, and about 10 warplanes practice air 
cover, surveillance and bombing runs near Dongshan and Nan Ao, on China's 
southeastern coast. Taiwan places its 400,OOO-member military on heightened alert, 
especially on the islands that face the exercise area. 
March 13, 1996 
China fires another missile near Taiwan, but unlike the others, this one does not cross 
Taiwan's territorial waters. The missile was an M-9 intermediate-range missile. 
March 14, 1996 
A key House panel Thursday approves a non-binding resolution urging the United States 
to intervene militarily if Taiwan is attacked, invaded, or blockaded by mainland China. 
In a voice vote, the House International Relations Committee passes the measure, which 
says the United States "should assist in defending (Taiwan) against invasion, missile 
attack, or blockade by the People's Republic of China." 
March 18, 1996 
The PRC launches a joint force maneuver into the sea near Pingtan, Fujian Province. 
March 19, 1996 
The PRC stages a landing exercise on a small islet. 
March 19, 1996 
The Clinton Administration approves Taiwan's request to buy Stinger air defense missiles 
and other weapons, a move officials say reflects a longstanding US commitment to help 
Taiwan defend itself. In addition to the Stingers, weapons of last resort against close-in 
air attack, Taiwanese authorities have permission to buy an advanced targeting and 
navigation system for fighter jets and electronic warfare devices. However, Taiwan's 
request for submarines is turned down. 
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March 21. 1996 
Taiwan's Defense Minister Chiang Chung-ling confirms reports that Taiwan will hold 
military exercises in its front-line Matsu Islands in early April, on the heels of China's 
war games in the Taiwan Strait. 
March 22, 1996 
USS Nimitz battle group arrives to the vicinity of Taiwan. 
March 23, 1996 
Taiwan holds its first-ever democratic elections for president as well as elections for 
members of the National Assembly. 
March 26, 1996 
China announced last night that its war games are over, temporarily halting moves to 
intimidate Taiwan, which completed an historic presidential election at the weekend. The 
United States announces that it will withdraw the US aircraft carriers currently operating 
in the area .. 
April 2, 1996 
Taiwan postpones military exercises set for April 7-10 near China. Taiwan's Defense 
Ministry, responding to US and domestic concerns, says the war games will be 
rescheduled for a June 30 start "to avoid any misunderstanding and to ease tensions" in 
the region. 
ill.3 Impact on Oil Markets 
Figures 3-6 below depict the impact of crisis events on the NYMEX oil market (figures 
for related markets are presented in Appendix A). Figures 3 and 4 summarize the major 
movements in the NYMEX spot price during this period. Of particular note is the gradual 
upward trend during most of this period culminating in several sharp jumps - March 18, 19, and 
March 20, followed by a sharp drop on the 21st. Toward the end of March, the upward trend 
upward resumed peaking in mid- April. 
The April price increases do not appear to be related to the Taiwan Strait crisis or its 
aftermath. According to accounts at the time appearing in the Financial Times, low stock levels 
and high demand because of cold weather hit the oil markets. Crude oil prices hit a five-year high 
in early April 1996. but later in the month began to drift down as consumption leveled off in the 
warmer season. 
Figure 5, tracing the difference between the spot and first forward rate and the difference 
between the first and second forward rates in the NYMEX market, depicts how the markets 
perceived risk during this period. The spot is the daily NYMEX crude oil rate, while the forward 
markets refer to contracts for crude oil twenty or so months into the future. A standard measure of 
risk as perceived by the markets is the premium of the spot price over the price of the first 
forward contract, or first over second forward. In particular the premium for earlier over later 
delivery was apparent with the sharp increase in the speeds between the spot and first forward 
rate, especially on March 20. The spread between the first and second forward started widening 
dramatically March 14, reaching a maximum on March 19. Both measures fall dramatically after 
the arrival of the Nimitz battle group. 
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The downward sloping forward profiles (Figure 6) in the NYMEX market suggest that 
throughout March 1996 there was widespread concern over the availability of secure oil 
deliveries. Traders during this period were willing to pay a considerable premium for earlier 
rather than later delivery. The forward profiles peak at the height of the Taiwan crisis on March 
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Figure 6 
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The Taiwan Strait case offers a good opportunity to apply the event analysis discussed in 
the methodology section to the actions associated with the crisis timeline. If in fact the markets 
are concerned with an impending conflict that may be potentially disruptive to trade, there should 
be movement in price(s) in response to events that are perceived to either heighten or lessen the 
likelihood of shortages, delays and the like. 
As noted in the methodology section, the key element in constructing an event analysis is 
the assignment of values for each key occurrence or development. Starting with the timeline, the 
following values were assigned on the basis of their perceived affect on oil markets. High values 
such +3 suggest that the markets interpret the event as one having potentially severe 
repercussions for continued production and availability of oil. On the other hand, a score of -3 
suggests that market interpret this event as one likely to improve the environment for increased 
production and availability. As noted above, the key issue in the Taiwan Strait case is the manner 
in which the markets interpreted the movement of US naval forces. 
The scoring in EVENT3 assumes a favorable response to naval action. A value of -2 is 
assigned to the December 19 action when the USS Nimitz battle group transited the Taiwan 
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Straits for the first time since 1979. A value of -3 is assigned to the March 22, 1996 action when 
the USS Nimitz battle group again arrived in the vicinity of Taiwan. The -2 and -3 scores are 
subjective and are assigned after a careful reading of the accounts of the time that suggest the 
March date provided a more decisive statement of US resolve. As a practical matter, the main 
findings of the case would not change if both events were scored with a -2 or a -3. 
To test alternative interpretations of the manner in which key markets interpreted the 
significance of naval actions during this period, several other event scoring schemes were 
devised. In the first, EVENT3A, the December 19 event receives a +2 with the March 22 event 
maintaining its -3 value. In EVENT3B both naval events receive positive values and in 
EVENT3C all events, naval and non naval, receive a positive score. In short we have different 
interpretations of the manner in which markets may have assessed naval actions. These move 
from EVENT3 where the markets are relieved at US intervention to EVENT3B where the 
markets are concerned that US naval actions may lead to conflict and possible supply 
interruptions. EVENT3C assumes EVENT3B effects and, in addition, that all other non-naval 
events also destabilize the situation. 
Summing up, based on this scheme, we would expect that if naval forces do in fact diffuse 
tension and restore market stability EVENT3 would have the strongest statistical associations 
with oil prices, this association would lessen with EVENT3A and be non-existent with 
EVENT3B and EVENT3C. The complete set of events and scores appear in Appendix B. The 
actual statistical output from the event analysis for this and other cases can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. The same applies to the national income models used to compute the 
economic impacts of crisis response by forward deployed naval forces. 
The following sections apply the methodology outlined above. One advantage of this 
approach is that the same basic technique can be applied across a spectrum of different markets. 
After the oil markets, NYMEX, the analysis focuses on several of the regional share markets, the 
Hang Seng (Hong Kong) and the Nikkei (Tokyo). Following the logic outlined above for the oil 
markets, if naval events allay fears and concerns of escalating conflict we should expect these 
markets to increase in value following crisis response. Finally, event analysis is applied to the 
yen/dollar exchange rate. Again, we would anticipate an appreciation of the dollar if markets 
view naval crisis response as preventing the escalation of a regional conflict. 
m.4.1 NYMEX Crude Oil Market 
The first statistical examination of the impact of events on the NYMEX market involved 
assessing the determinants of the spread between the first and second forward contract. This 
spread is a standard measure of the market's assessment of risk. The greater the premium for 
immediate delivery, the greater fear traders have that the crisis will result in supply interruptions 
and delays-they are willing to pay a premium for immediate delivery rather than taking their 
chances on delivery at a later time. 
Correcting for serial correlation and introducing the event variables produced a striking 
result. For all cases (separately using EVENT3, EVENT3A, etc.), increased daily volatility (as 
proxied by the difference between the close and opening of the day), presumably reflecting 
uncertainty, increases the spread between the first and second forward contract. When all of the 
event variables have a positive sign (EVENT3C) the event variable does not affect this spread 
(the variable is not statistically significant). However, as more and more individual events take 
on negative signs the statistical significance of the event term increases, culminating in EVENT3 
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where all US Navy developments have a negative sign. Here the event term reduces the premium 
on earlier delivery, suggesting that naval crisis response reassures the markets that supplies will 
not be disrupted. 
Next, an analysis was undertaken of the short and longer-run impact of naval actions on oil 
prices (Figure 7). (The statistical results from the ARDLlerror correction analysis that form the 
basis of the discussion below are available from Dr. Looney.) Here a similar pattern occurred. 
Starting with EVENT3C (all events cause oil price increases), there was no statistical relationship 
between the major crisis developments and oil price increases. However as the naval events were 
assigned negative signs (i.e., depicting the hypothesis that naval action reduces oil prices), the 
event term became both stronger in terms of the size of its coefficient and in statistical 
significance. Thus naval actions during this period contributed to lower oil prices than would 
have prevailed if naval activity had been absent. 
The analysis also confirms that naval actions contribute to the long-term adjustment of the 
oil markets following various event shocks. As noted in the example in the methodology section, 
the error correction mechanism, or ecm term, controls this adjustment over time. The term itself 
reflects the NYMEX's deviation from the long-run historical pattern it has established with the 
Brent markets. The ecm term has a negative sign in the NYMEX price equation and is 
proportional to the difference between the NYMEX and Brent prices. For example, higher Brent 
prices would, everything else equal, reduce the size of the ecm term, thus reducing that term's 
negative impact on oil prices over time. EVENT3 is also in the ecm term suggesting that 
stabilizing naval actions control the movement of the NYMEX market price over time. 
The negative sign on the EVENT3 term in the ARDL's ecm term is consistent with this 
interpretation. More negatively signed naval events, again everything else equal, would reduce 
the value of the EVENT3 term, thus increasing the size of the ecm term. Given the ecm term's 
negative impact on oil prices, the consequences of naval activity would be a slowing down over 
time in NYMEX price increases following other shocks. 
It follows that increases in non-naval events (for the most part positively signed) would 
tend, as with increases in the Brent prices, to reduce the size of the ecm term, thus reducing price 
retarding pressures on the NYMEX markets. Finally these interpretations are consistent with the 
finding of a lack of statistical significance of event terms scored on the hypothesis that naval 
activity results in higher oil prices. 
111.4.2 The Hang Seng Share Markets 
Several observers have noted the apparent linkage between some of the Taiwan crisis 
events and simultaneous movements in the Hang Seng (Hong Kong) share index. However, just 
because that index goes up or down on one day or another would hardly seem to be of major 
significance for the United States economy, or any other major economy for that matter. On the 
other hand, if events such as naval actions affect the longer run adjustment of that market, there 
would no doubt be a number of important consequences for other markets and perhaps even 
major economies. 
Following the methods used above to assess the movements in the NYMEX oil markets, 
the event terms were introduced to determine any possible short- and long-run associations with 
the Hang Seng Index. Here EVENT3, EVENT3A and so on retained their signs from the 
NYMEX analysis on the assumption that favorable events in the NYMEX markets (in the sense 
of lower oil prices) would have a predictable corresponding impact on the Hang Sing share 
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market (higher values). If we assume the same trader physiology across a wide variety of 
markets, naval events that lowered the price of oil should simultaneously raise share prices. It 
follows that the event variables should have the reverse signs in the Hang Seng equations from 
those found in the NYMEX market analysis. 
Figure 7 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: 
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Note: Column I depicts the event measures (EVENT3B and EVENT3C) that were not 
statistically significant in affecting the NYMEX oil markets. The second column identifies those 
event variables (EVENT3 and EVENT3A) that formed a statistically significant relationship with 
the NYMEX markets. Drawing on Column 2, Column 3 depicts the variables (EVENT3, 
EVENT3A and the Brent markets that establish a long-run relationship with the NYMEX. Based 
on the signs of the regression coefficients, Column 4 summarizes the probable net impact (short-
and longer-run effects) of naval and non-naval events on the NYMEX. 
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The main findings (Figure 8) show a pattern similar to the NYMEX analysis. Events 
EVENT3B and EVENT3C that incorporated positive signs for naval actions were not statistically 
significant. In other words'the assumption that naval events accelerate uncertainty and instability 
lacks empirical verification. On the other hand the two events that assume a stabilizing role for 
naval actions (EVENT3 and EVENT3A) were statistically significant, with the significance 
increasing with all naval events possessing a negative sign (EVENT3). 
In the short-run EVENT3 (naval events stabilizing) has a negative sign in the Hang Seng 
index equation. Clearly increased naval activities lowering the size of this term would tend to 
impact favorably on that market's overall valuation. The Hang Seng also moves in response to 
movements in the FTSE-loo and the New York Stock Exchange's Composite index. 
In the longer term the ecm or adjustment term has, as in the NYMEX market, a negative 
sign. This suggests restraints on the longer run movements in the Hang Seng. For example, 
everything else equal, increases in the NYSE or the FTSE-loo tend to retard declines in the Hang 
Seng. In contrast to the NYMEX, the EVENT3 term has a negative sign in the ecm term. This 
suggests that positively signed (non-naval) events associated with the crisis increase the size of 
the ecm term, thus placing greater pressure on the Hang Seng to move downward over time. On 
the other hand the negatively signed naval events reduce the size of the ecm term, thus everything 
else equal, causing generally higher share prices over time. 
111.4.3 The Nikkei Share Markets 
The other major regional share market is the Nikkei (Tokyo). While this market was 
somewhat more removed from the conflict site, the Japanese economy itself is very dependent on 
access to energy and other critical imports. It is likely therefore that concerns over Taiwan would 
get translated into the Nikkei markets. 
In most respects, the ARDL analysis of the Nikkei produced results (Figure 9) very similar 
to those obtained from the Hang Seng: 
• The event variables incorporating the navy's stabilizing role are statistically 
significant. In contrast, those formulations based on the assumption that naval events 
produce increased uncertainty and instability were not statistically significant. 
• The significance of the event variables increase as the navy's assumed stabilizing 
role increases. 
• Naval activities produce not only a stabilizing short-run effect, but more importantly 
contribute to long-run movements in the Nikkei index. That is, naval events would 
be expected to increase the over-all value of the Nikkei over time. 
• Conversely, non-naval crisis related events would most likely reduce share values 
overtime. 
• One difference between the Hang Seng and Nikkei indexes is the role of other share 
markets. The Hang Seng reflects movements in both the FTSE and the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite index. 
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• The Nikkei on the other hand does not appear (at least in the period under 
construction) to be affected by movements in these markets. Instead the Nikkei 
appears mainly influenced by movements in the dollar/yen exchange rate, with 
devaluations in the dollar/yen rate depressing share values. 
Figure 8 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDLlerror correction analysis. See Figure 7 for a description of 
the main linkages and their interpretation. 
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Figure 9 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: 
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of the main linkages and their interpretation_ 
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111.4.4 The DollarlY en Exchange Rate 
The dollar/yen exchange rate is of critical importance for both the United States and 
Japanese economies. If this exchange rate gets too far out of alignment, both countries can feel 
increased economic strains leading to frictions and conflicts in other areas. While it is 
controversial as to what the "correct" exchange rate between these two leading currencies is at 
any particular point in time, it is of interest to assess the manner that crisis affect that rate over 
time. Do confrontations such as the one in the Taiwan Strait strengthen or weaken the dollar with 
regard to the yen? Do naval events have a longer run carry over effect on the value at which 
these currencies trade? Again, the ARDL analysis identified (Figure 10) a series of key linkages 
between naval activity and the strength of the dollar. 
The main findings of the dollar/yen event analysis are as follows: 
• In contrast to the other markets examined, only the event variable (EVENT3) with all 
naval events having a negative. signs was statistically significant. 
• The short-run sign on EVENT3 is negative suggesting that increased naval activity 
(because of its negative sign) tends to cause an appreciation of the dollar (relative to 
the yen). 
• Similarly, non-naval events because of their less predictable consequences tend to 
weaken the dollar. 
• As noted above, the Nikkei is linked to the dollar/yen rate with increased value in the 
Nikkei causing a decline in the dollar (no doubt though investors shifting out of 
dollar assets to purchase an increased number of yen denominated shares). 
• As with the other markets examined here, the event term contributes to the long-term 
adjustment in exchange rate markets. Given its negative value, the ecm term in the 
yen dollar equation tends to retard the appreciation of the dollar. For example the 
Nikkei has a positive sign in the ecm equation. Increased value in the Nikkei thus 
increases the ecm term, placing a drag on potential dollar appreciation. 
• Similarly, the EVENT3 term has a positive sign in the ecm equation. Here, 
positively signed non-naval events would create increased uncertainty over 
conditions in the region. In turn this would be reflected in a larger ecm term and, 
given that term's negative sign in the dollar/yen equation, a suppressing effect on any 
potential dollar appreciation. 
• Conversely, negative signed naval events would tend to reduce the size of the ecm 
term, thus providing, everything else equal, greater dollar appreciation over time. 
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Figure 10 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDLlerror correction analysis. See Figure 7 for a description 
of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
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111.4.5 Summary 
Several results are of note. The four dominant markets in the region, NYMEX, the Hang 
Seng share market, the yen, and the Nikkei share market were all affected by the crisis with naval 
forward presence providing the impact one would expect if in fact the naval forces provided a 
stabilizing role-lower oil prices, higher share prices, dollar and the like. 
Other markets, the Brent oil market, the CRB commodity markets, the Mark, the FI'SE, the 
NYSE, the Dollar Index were not directly affected (at least not in the statistical sense used here). 
This suggests that the findings for the East Asian markets were not the result of a spurious 
correlation with some unspecified worldwide phenomenon. 
On the other hand, since several of these markets were cointegrated with the East-Asian 
markets, it is likely there was a carry-over effect to other parts of the globe. Specifically, the 
Brent markets for example are highly cointegrated with the NYMEX. It follows that adjustments 
in the NYMEX subsequent to an event would ultimately alter the Brent Crude price of oil. 
Most importantly the event analysis confirms the assumptions made below in the 
calculation of economic benefits associated with naval crisis response. The dates chosen were 
correct and the assumptions concerning the appropriate lags were also confirmed by the event 
analysis. 
111.5 Economic Benefits 
The event analysis suggests that two key naval events occurring on December 19, 1995, 
and March 22, 1996 tended to reduce pressure on the NYMEX oil markets. The key dates for the 
calculations of economic benefits associated with naval forward presence/crisis response are: 
March 1, 1996 
A benchmark before the crisis unfolds. This was a period of relative stability in the oil markets 
before a series of announcements and press speculations set off increases in the price of oil. 
March 20,1996 
Based on the movements of the spot and forward profiles, this date appears to be the peak of the 
crisis, or at least the period of greatest uncertainty precipitated by a series of hostile PRC 
statements and actions 
March 22, 1996 
USS Nimitz Battle Groups arrive in the vicinity of Taiwan, which as the event analysis suggests 
was a key element in stabilizing the oil/share and exchange rate market. 
The NYMEX forward profiles (Figure 6, page 21) depict development in the oil markets 
on these key dates. 
111.5.1 Assumptions 
As the event analysis suggests, naval actions during this period had a number of significant 
impacts on key markets: the NYMEX crude oil market, the Hang Seng and Nikkei share markets 
and the DoIlarlY en exchange rate. Translating these impacts into tangible economic benefits to 
the United States economy, however, is complicated by several conceptual problems. 
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First, the great time difference between Taiwan and New York makes the selection of dates 
for the calculation a bit fuzzy. Although the Nimitz arrived in the vicinity of Taiwan on March 
22 (local time), this was still March 21 in New York, and hence some of the effect of this naval 
action was no doubt registered in the NYMEX on the 21 st • On the other hand the event analysis 
suggests that the optimal lag for the naval event impact was one day, which suggests that March 
22 is probably the more reliable date for the calculation of benefits. 
Second, just what crisis and run up in oil prices did the Nimitz affect? Should the 
differential between March 1 and March 22 be the interval for the Nimitz's impact? This 
calculation would suggest that the Nimitz effect's benefits be calculated in terms of some earlier 
equilibration in the oil markets before the initiation of Chinese actions and announcements. 
Unfortunately setting a date, say, before March 5 (key Chinese announcement) is somewhat 
arbitrary. As noted, March 1 makes sense, but there are other candidates as well. Alternatively, is 
it the difference between the height of the crisis on March 20 and March 22? The latter would 
seem to provide a more tangible situation to examine. 
111.5.2 Findings 
Following the methodology outlined earlier in the report, the economic impact on the US 
economy is calculated on the basis of the different prices that were reflected by the forward 
markets on the key dates noted above. In turn, these prices shock key variables in the US 
economy-mainly several types of investment. Shifts in investment as well as energy and 
exchange rates in turn ripple through the economy to change Gross Domestic Product from what 
it would be under a different set of oil/exchange rates. In short, what would the US economy 
have looked like if the prices existing in forward markets on March 20 and March 22 actually 
come to pass? The differences in GDP under each scenario represent the economic impact 
associated with naval forward presence/crisis response. 
As a basis of comparison, three calculations derived from the assumed future NYMEX oil 
price and the dollar/yen exchange rates as they impact on the V AR model of the US economy are 
presented (Table 2): 
• A total crisis impact-based on the different economic environments associated with 
(March 1 - March 20 interval) 
• Crisis Response A - reflecting date/time vagueness -- based on the different 
economic environments associated with (March 20-March 21 interval) 
• Crisis Response B - the best estimate for reasons noted above - based on the 
different economic environments associated with (March 20-March 22 interval). 
Summing up: 
• The most likely sum of economic benefits derived by the United States from Naval 
Forward Presence during this period is approximately $3.4 billion (1995) dollars (Crisis 
Response B). 
• A slightly less plausible estimate is $6.4 billion (Crisis Response A). 
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• However, if one argues that the true benefits associated with naval forward presence 
and crisis response should be measured in terms of a counterfactual decline in GDP that 
might have occurred if no naval response whatsoever was made, then a high, but still 
credible estimate, would lie between Crisis Response A and the Crisis Response Impact 
totaling 14.9 billion [6.4 - (-8.5)] and Crisis Response B and the Crisis Response 
Impact or 11.9 billion [3.4 - (-8.5)]. 
111.6 Conclusions 
The findings for the Taiwan Strait Crisis came at somewhat of a surprise. Most analysts 
had assumed that because oil was not directly involved, the economic benefits associated with 
this naval crisis response were nill. While several markets including the Hang Seng were 
examined (System Planning Corporation 1996), the general feeling was that the movements in 
these regional markets were more overnight effects, perhaps more influenced by movements in 
US interest rates than crisis events. The conventional wisdom was that their movements were 
unlikely to be of much significance for the United States economy. For this reason, our initial 
study did not delve into the case. 
In contrast, the analysis above shows that the crisis and associated naval events affected a 
wide variety of markets including the important NYMEX crude oil price. More importantly, the 
events of the crisis not only produced the overnight effects but also set off a long-run adjustment 
process with naval events providing a significant stabilizing role-lowering oil prices and 
increasing the values of shares and the dollar from ranges they would have assumed in the 
absence of naval intervention. These market movements and associated forward prices then 
impacted the United States Economy to produce significant savings in lost GDP of, at a 
minimum, 3.4 billion 1995 US Dollars. 
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Table 2 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: 
Naval Forward Presence Impact on the United States Economy 
Oil Price/ Dollar-Yen Effects 
(United States GDP in Billions 1995 Dollars) 
Crisis Crisis Crisis 
Response Response Response 
Impact A B 
Quarterly Impact 
1996Ql 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 
1996Q2 1.7 -0.6 -0.2 
1996Q3 0.7 0.1 0.3 
1996Q4 -0.5 0.7 0.6 
1997Ql -1.5 1.2 0.8 
1997Q2 -2.4 1.6 0.9 
1997Q3 -3.2 1.8 0.7 
1997Q4 -3.9 1.9 0.5 
Total Impact 
Through 1997 -8.5 6.4 3.4 
Notes: The statistical output of the ARDLlerror correction analyses and V AR models on which 
these results are based are contained in a separate set of appendices available from the authors. 
Crisis Response Impact derived by subtracting the United States' GDP estimated on the 
assumption of March 1 oil and dollar/yen forward prices from that estimated on the basis of 
March 20 oil, dollar/yen prices. 
Crisis Response A = same calculation as Crisis Impact but with (March 21 minus March 20) 
prices. 
Crisis Response B = same calculation as Crisis impact but with (March 22 minus March 20) 
prices. 
V AR Model Construction: 
Dependent Variables: GDP (USARGDPS), Private Consumption (USACSMRX), Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (USAINVTS), Expenditure on Machinery and Equipment (USAIMCHS), 
Construction (USAICONS), Government Consumption (USAGOVTX). Exogenous Variables: 
Oil Prices (NYMEX), Dollar Yen Exchange Rate (YEN) with March 1,20,22, 1996 Spot and 
Associated forward rates: 1996Q2 - 1997Q 1. V AR Model Order = 1. 
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IV. Operation Desert Strike 
IV.I Overview 
In early 1996, despite warnings from the United States, Iraq moved 40,000 troops into 
northern Iraq threatening the Kurdish population. In response, the president ordered a strike on 
military targets posing a threat to coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone. 
On August 31, 1996, elements of the Iraqi Army attacked and captured the town of Irbil in 
the Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq. This renewed Iraqi aggression, led by a 
Republican Guard mechanized division with the support of regular army troops, alarmed the 
United States and coalition forces in the region. Rhetoric from Baghdad threatened Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) partners if they assisted the United States in retaliation, while Iraqi 
air defense forces launched surface to air missiles against USAF fighter aircraft patrolling the 
northern and southern "no-fly" zones. In response to the seizure of Irbil, the US Central 
Command assessed an increased threat to America's interests and moved quickly to bolster its 
ability to protect those vital national interests on the Arabian Peninsula. In close consultation with 
the National Command Authority (NCA) , Central Command began to develop appropriate 
military responses to deter further aggression. 
Saddam's actions suggested a new willingness to use overwhelming conventional forces to 
continue their oppression of the Kurds. This willingness increased the threat of aggression against 
allied forces enforcing United Nations resolutions and international relief workers delivering 
humanitarian supplies. 
To prevent enhancement of offensive capabilities in the south and prepare for potential 
follow-on operations, the NCA directed an immediate military response. In consultation with its 
coalition partners, Central Command evaluated alternative responses from among those available 
in the region. Against a requirement to send a clear signal of international condemnation for the 
latest violation of UN resolutions, Central Command planned and executed Operation Desert 
Strike. 
IV.2 Timeline 
As opposed to the other cases, there was not a long sequence of specific events leading up 
to Desert Strike. No doubt the US government conveyed warnings to Iraq through diplomatic 
channels. However, there were not the public warnings that alert markets that a crisis is 
impending. For this reason, it was impossible to carry out an Event analysis as in the other cases 
under review. 
September 2, 1996 
A coordinated cruise missile attack was launched against the Iraqi air defense infrastructure, 
including surface-to-air missile sites and command and control nodes in southern Iraq. USS 
Laboon (DDG 58) and USS Shiloh (CG 67), on station in the Gulf as part of Task Force 50, fired 
14 of the 27 cruise missiles while Air Force B-52s, escorted by F-14s from USS Carl Vinson 
(CVN 70), fired 13 conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCMs). 
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September 3, 1996 
A second strike of 17 Tomahawks from destroyers USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Hewitt (DD 
966), USS Laboon and nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) was 
conducted. USS Enterprise (CVN 65) departed the Adriatic Sea on order of the National 
Command Authority and conducted a high-speed transit through the Suez Canal, arriving in the 
theater two days later. 
IV .3 Oil Market Developments 
Oil prices were increasing prior to the US missile launch on Iraq (Figure 11). As the New 
York Times noted ("Oil Prices Advance After UN Delays Iraq's Entry in the Market," September 
3, 1996, p. D-6), much of this increase stemmed from the United Nation's delays in letting Iraq 
sell oil again. The dollar also rose, and the shares of oil companies rose on foreign exchanges, 
benefiting from renewed tension in the Middle East. At this time it was clear that traders had 
been expecting Iraq's first oil sales since the Persian Gulf War to hit markets in the next several 
weeks. Traders noted (Financial Times, The Lex Column: "Flying High," September 3, 1996, p. 
1) that uncertainty over the timing of Iraqi crude exports, which had been expected later in 
September, should underpin oil prices at least in the short-term. 
On September 3, the Financial Times (Robert Corzine, "Delay to Iraqi Sales Boosts Oil 
Prices," September 3, 1996, p. 5) also noted that any allied military action against Iraq could give 
a further boost to oil prices (which had been rising sharply over the past month due to unease 
about the tougher US position towards Iran and the wider potential for Middle East instability). 
At this time (September 3) concern over increased world oil prices and expectations of a rise in 
US interest rates led to a rise in the US dollar against the D-mark and the yen (Appendix C). 
On September 5, The Financial Times (Robert Corzine, "Oil Price Yo-Yos as Traders 
Digest News From Iraq," September 5, 1996, p. 3) noted that international oil companies and 
traders continued to adjust their buying strategies to reflect the widespread expectation that Iraqi 
oil will not be a factor in world markets this year. Many traders had already shifted their attention 
to possible alternative sources. Much debate centered on whether countries outside the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries could step in to make up for any shortfall. 
IVA Key Events for Economic Benefit Calculations 
September 2, 1996 
A coordinated cruise missile attack was launched against the Iraqi air defense infrastructure. 
September 3. 1996 
A second strike of 17 Tomahawks from destroyers was launched. 
September 4, 1996 
The key developments on this date were the decline from September 3 in the NYMEX spot rate. 
Also on September 4 the spot rate had fallen below the first forward contract. The first forward 
contract was also smaller than the second forward contract. These patterns suggest that the 
markets quickly equilibrated once naval operations were concluded. Apparently, traders assumed 
that the US mission had been accomplished and there would be no Iraqi follow-ups that would 
jeopardize stability in the region. 
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September 16, 1996 
By September 16, the second future contract (Figure 12) was trading at a sizable premium over 
the first forward contract. This pattern suggests that the markets had assessed the military 
situation in the Gulf and had concluded that stability was assured for the foreseeable future. The 
markets heavily discounted the possibility of increased Iraqi destabilization. 
Figure 11 
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IV.5 Calculation of Economic Benefits 
Initial tests of the V AR Model for the United States economy suggested that both the 
NYMEX spot oil price (NYMEXS) and the dollar/yen exchange rate (YEN) were statistically 
significant. The dollar index itself (DI) was not statistically significant and was hence omitted 
from the analysis. Based on the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion, the optimal V AR order was set at 1. 
In addition to the NYMEX and YEN rates, the variables used in forecasting the US 
economy were: gross fixed capital formation (USAINVTS), Investment in Machinery and 
Equipment (USAIMCHS), and government final consumption (USAGOVTX). 
IV.5.1 Assumptions 
Using these variables and the forward rates associated with the dollar/yen and NYMEX oil 
prices for September 3, September 4 and September 16, estimates were made of the differential in 
US GDP that was implied by the start and conclusion of naval operations. The first calculation is 
the short-run equilibration following cessation of operations. That is, the United States GDP was 
estimated on the basis of the forward prices prevailing on September 4 and September 3. 
37 
The differential GDP (September 4 - September 3) projected by these two patterns of 
dollar/yen and NYMEX rates is the short-run impact of naval operations. Assuming the markets 
had fully equilibrated by September 16, as second set of calculations was made, again using the 
forward rates of the dollar/yen and NYMEX on that date. The September 3 forecasts of US GDP 
were then subtracted from these (September 16 - September 3), to arrive at the full impact of 
Naval operations. 
IV .5.2 Findings 
The model shows continued gains over time (Table 3). However it is unlikely that the true 
impact of naval operations lasted much past 1997. A safe estimate is that the benefits of naval 
forward presence were somewhere between 2.0 and 4.2 billion 1995 dollars. 
IV.6 Conclusions 
This is an interesting case in that it was of very short duration and came at a time when 
oil markets were on the upswing. There was also considerable uncertainty on the manner in which 
Iraq would respond to the operation. Despite these rather adverse conditions, Naval operations 
were able to play a significant role in stabilizing oil markets, thus producing again significant 
economic benefits to the United States economy. 
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Table 3 
Operation Desert Strike: 
Naval Crisis Response Impact 
on the United States Economy: Oil PricelY en Effects 




Impact by Quarter 
1996Q3 0.0 0.2 
1996Q4 0.0 0.2 
1997Ql 0.1 0.2 
1997Q2 0.1 0.3 
1997Q3 0.2 0.5 
1997Q4 0.3 0.6 
1998Ql 0.3 0.6 
1998Q2 0.3 0.6 
1998Q3 0.3 0.5 
1998Q4 0.3 0.5 
1999Ql 0.3 0.5 
1999Q2 0.4 0.5 
1999Q3 0.4 0.5 
1999Q4 0.4 0.5 
Impact Through 1997 0.7 2 
Impact Through 1998 1.9 4.2 
Impact Through 1999 3.4 6.2 
Notes: The statistical output of the ARDLierror correction analyses and V AR models on which 
these results are based are contained in a separate set of appendices available from the authors. 
Initial Impact = (September 4 - September 3; Impact Equilibrium = (September 16 - September 
3). 
Initial Impact derived by subtracting the United States' GDP estimated on the assumption of 
September 3 oil and dollar/yen forward prices from that estimated on the basis of September 4 oil 
and dollar/yen prices. 
Impact Equilibrium derived by subtracting the United States' GDP estimated on the assumption 
of September 3 oil and dollar/yen forward prices from that estimated on the basis of September 
16 oil and dollar/yen prices. 
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V. Operation Desert Fox 
V.IOverview 
The tensions over weapons inspections that began in October 1997 continued into 1998. In 
February, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan worked out an agreement with Iraq that resumed 
weapons inspections. In turn, Iraq received promises the United Nations will consider removing 
its economic sanctions. Inspections continued into August, when Iraq cuts ties with weapons 
inspectors, claiming it has seen no U.N. move toward lifting sanctions. The objectives of 
Operations Desert Fox were to degrade Iraq's ability to produce and use weapons of mass 
destruction and to demonstrate the consequences of violating international obligations. 
V.2 Timeline 
October 31, 1998 
Iraq cuts off all work by U.N. monitors. The United States and Great Britain warn of 
possible military strikes to force compliance. A renewed military build-up in the Persian Gulf 
begins. 
November 5, 1998 
The UN Security Council condemns Iraq for violating agreements signed after the end of 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
November 11, 1998 
With B-52 bombers in the air and within about 20 minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein 
agrees to allow U.N. monitors back in. The bombers are recalled before an attack occurs. 
Weapons inspectors return to Iraq a few days later. 
December 8, 1998 
Chief U.N. weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. 
UN teams begin departing Iraq. 
December 16, 1998 
A formal UN report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections 
by not allowing access to records and inspections sites, and by moving equipment records and 
equipment from one to site another. 
December 17, 1998 
The United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign principally involving our 
naval forces. The operation involved Navy and Marine Corps strike aircraft from the USS 
Enterprise and over 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Navy ships. The attack began 
at 0100 Thursday. In addition, the USS Carl Vinson, was ordered to speed up its movement from 
the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. In the morning, 2,000 marines from the amphibious 
assault ship USS Belleau Wood conduct training exercises close to the Kuwait border. A second 
round of air strikes begins in the early evening, Iraqi time. The second wave sends cruise missiles 
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deep into Iraq and Navy strike aircraft with laser-guided bombs targeting Iraqi air defenses along 
the border. 
December 18. 1998 
Third night of attacks. 
December 19. 1998 
Explosions shake central Baghdad. A second US aircraft carrier battle group led by the 
USS Carl Vinson moves into the Gulf. 
December 20, 1998 
President Clinton suspends military action against Iraq after a fourth day of air strikes 
saying the "operation is now complete." 
V.3 Event Analysis 
An event analysis of the period October 1 through December 31, 1998 was undertaken to 
determine if a valid statistical relationship existed between naval actions in the Gulf and the 
major oil, commodity, and share markets. As with the event analysis of the other cases, the main 
goal of this exercise is to determine whether and to what extent a statistical association exists 
between naval events and the movements of prices in these markets. If an association exists, is it 
a positive one of assuring the markets of stability and security, or, in contrast, is the relationship 
one of increased uncertainty over future oil production and access? 
Using the time line for the main events during this period (October 1 through December 31, 
1998), the key events are coded (Appendix D) to test these alternative views of naval forward 
presence and crisis response. In actuality, the two series differ on only two dates, December 17 
and 18. EVENTA assumes the naval actions on these days created increased concern over oil 
availabilities from the Gulf and hence forced oil prices up (the events are assigned a positive 
number). In contrast EVENTB looks at these events as an indication of US resolve and 
commitment to preserving stability in the region. It follows that the events are assigned a negative 
sign in EVENTB. 
Using these two sets of event codes as independent variables, a cointegrationlerror 
correction analysis was undertaken to determine the manner in which naval actions interacted 
with key economic markets. This analysis is ideal for the problem at hand because it focuses on 
the problem of identifying shocks to a system and the manner in which the system adjusts to 
those shocks. Specifically, the analysis breaks down patterns over time into two components, a 
short-run impact (event) and a longer run adjustment whereby historical patterns are re-
established. 
V.3.1 The NYMEX Crude Oil Market 
Analysis of the NYMEX crude oil markets suggests that the naval actions during this 
period stabilized rather than destabilized oil markets. Specifically, EVENTB is statistically 
significant over a wide variety of alternative specifications, whereas EVENTA is statistically 
insignificant in all cases. 
The analysis also validates the applicability of the cointegrationlerror-correction 
mechanism in this market. That is, the NYMEX market is characterized by being affected by a 
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series of short-run shocks (events). Following these shocks, a longer-run period of adjustment 
restores the NYMEX's historical relationship with other commodity/energy markets. The main 
findings are outlined in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 
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Note: Graphical depiction of the results from the ARDLlerror correction analysis. In the short-run 
naval actions reduce oil price pressures, whereas non-naval actions increase prices in these 
markets. The same applies to movements in the Brent oil markets, the CRB commodity futures 
index and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Futures Markets. Naval/non-naval events along with 
these three markets also form a long-run pattern with the NYMEX with naval actions the only 
variable lowering oil prices over this time interval. 
Given their negative sign in the EVENTB variable and that variable's positive sign in the 
NYMEX regression equation, it is apparent that naval actions lower the spot oil price. In contrast, 
other events such as Iraqi belligerence, etc., would tend to raise the price of oil. Since the 
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NYMEX establishes a long-run pattern with several commodity markets, the CRB and the 
Goldman-Sachs, increases in their price is also reflected in movements in the NYMEX. 
Because the NYMEX maintains a long-run pattern with other commodity markets, naval 
events also play a role in re-establishing these relationships through influencing the pattern of 
long-run adjustment. An error correction process through which oil market equilibrium is 
restored depicts this adjustment mechanism. In the case at hand, a typical pattern is one whereby 
the error correction term (ecm) has a negative sign in the NYMEX equation. This means that 
increases in the ecm reduce price pressures in the NYMEX market. 
A typical pattern in the ecm equation is one in which a variable such as the Brent oil price 
has a negative sign. Increases in the Brent oil price therefore set off a process of adjustment in 
the NYMEX market to restore the long-run pattern between the two markets. Because the 
BRENT variable has a negative sign it reduces the size of the ecm term. This in tum, because of 
it's negative sign in the NYMEX equation, results in upward pressure on the NYMEX, thus 
aiding in reestablishing the long-run patterns between the two markets. 
The EVENTB variable also has a negative sign, suggesting that as with the BRENT, 
increased values would tend over time to result in increased NYMEX oil prices. This is clearly 
true for the non-naval events. However, since naval events have a negative sign in this variable, 
the reverse occurs. That is, everything else equal, naval events during this period actually 
resulted in lower prices over time as a mechanism of restoring equilibrium in the NYMEX 
market. 
V.3.2 The S&P-IOO Index 
Share prices are quite volatile and are said to reflect the market's assessment of key events' 
impact on future profitability and the like. In general the markets prefer certainty and, more often 
than not, increase in value during periods of relative stability. As is well known, the share 
markets are averse to uncertainty, often going into prolonged declines until whatever they are 
leery of is resolved. One often hears that US naval actions, particularly ones similar to those 
examined in this case, create, in the net, more doubts and uncertainty over future economic 
conditions and hence depress the share markets. In actuality, the event analysis suggests that quite 
the reverse is the case. 
Event analysis again identified the existence of a number of long-run patterns that are re-
established following a destabilizing event. In the case of the S&P-I00, long-run patterns at this 
time existed with the New York Stock Exchange Composite index (NYSE) and the dollar index. 
See Figure 14. Increases in the NYSE and the dollar index set off a long-run-adjustment in the 
S&P raising its value commensurate with the other two. EVENTB has a negative relationship 
(negative sign in the S&P value equation). Everything else equal, an increased level of events 
should depress the S&P. This is true for most events. However, naval events in EVENTB have a 
negative sign so their presence actually results in an increase in share prices. 
EVENTB has a positive sign in the ecm or long-run correction effect following a shock. 
Given the negative sign of the ecm in the S&P share price equation, it appears that most events 
would again tend to reduce the value in this market. Again however, because naval events have a 
negative sign in the EVENTB term, their presence actually results in increased share prices 
during the long-run adjustment process. 
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V.3.3 The CRB and Goldman Sachs Commodity Indexes 
These two key commodity indexes were also affected by developments during this period 
in the Gulf. See Figures 15 and 16. The mechanisms are quite similar to those associated with the 
NYMEX market described above. Both markets reacted negatively (increased price due to 
perceived risk) to non-naval events in the Gulf. As with the NYMEX, both markets interpreted 
naval events as providing increased security and certainty of supplies. This was true not only in 
terms of the short-run impact of naval events, but through their affecting lower prices over time 
during the period of longer-run recovery from events in the region. 
V.3.4 Implications 
The important finding here is that while naval events have an apparent short-run stabilizing 
effect on key markets, they also set off a long-run adjustment process (at least in the markets 
examined here) that is subtle, but more significant in terms of total magnitude. In large part, the 
subtle nature of these long-run effects explains why they have not been previously detected and 
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of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
46 
Figure 16 
Operation Desert Fox: Event Analysis of the Goldman-Sachs Commodity Index 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDLlerror correction analysis. See Figure 13 for a description 
of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
V.4 Oil Market Developments 
The Financial Times accounts of this period (Paul Solman, "Oil Prices Slipped Yesterday 
in Spite of Continued Military Action in the Gulf," Financial Times, December 18, 1998, p. 34; 
Robert Corzine, "Slide in Crude Surprises All," Financial Times, December 24, 1998, p. 20) 
suggest that the outlook for a sustained price increase was uncertain at best. According to that 
source, the factors that triggered and exacerbated the price declines in 1997 - a collapse in Asian 
demand due to the regional financial crisis, rising Iraqi exports, an uncertain global economic 
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outlook, a surplus of crude oil and refined products and erratic compliance by members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to promised production cuts - had not yet 
dissipated. 
The view among oil companies was generally bearish (Paul Solman, "Oil Prices Continue 
to Drift Downward," Financial Times, December 11, 1998, p. 30; Paul Solman, "Outlook for Oil 
Remains Uncertain," Financial Times, January 2, 1999, p. 8; Robert Corzine, "Prospects for 
Firmer Prices Uncertain," Financial Times, January 29, 1999, p. 3). Most appeared resigned to a 
prolonged period of low crude prices, with some even arguing that the present downturn might be 
much more than merely the rock bottom of the commodity cycle. Many thought that the global 
industry might be facing a fundamental restructuring and realignment, with low-cost producers, 
especially those in the Middle East, likely to reassert their dominance in coming years at the 
expense ~fhigher cost areas, such as onshore North America and the North Sea. 
V.5 Economic Benefits 
Key Dates 
December 8, 1998 
Chief UN weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. 
UN teams begin departing Iraq. Prior to this date the oil markets had been relatively calm with 
only minor changes in the NYMEX over the period December 2 through the 8th • Also, on 
December 8 the spot was just slightly below the first forward contract indicating the markets had 
little concern over supply availabilities. This is evidenced by the general pattern of forward rates 
gradually sloping upward during this period. There was never an extremely high premium for 
earlier rather than later delivery (downward sloping forward profiles) as had characterized the 
period right after the invasion of Kuwait (Desert Storm). 
December 9,1998 
Starting on the 9th however, the spot started trading at a considerable premium vis-a-vis the 
first forward contract. See Figure 17. It is therefore fairly safe to say that the markets were in 
short-run equilibrium on the 8th , only to become somewhat alarmed by deteriorating conditions 
after that date. 
December 16, 1998 
A formal UN report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections. 
As the chart below indicates, however, the spot market was considerably below the first forward 
suggesting little concern over availability of deliveries. This is also borne out by the generally 
negative values for the first-second forward contracts during the period. 
December 17, 1998 
The United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign principally involving 
naval forces. Oil markets react with a sharp increase in the spot rate. 
December 20, 1998 
President Clinton suspends military action against Iraq after a fourth day of air strikes, 
saying the "operation is now complete." The markets appear to have equilibrated quickly on the 
first subsequent day of trading (Monday, December 21, 1998). 
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V.S.1 Assumptions 
These developments and movements in the oil markets suggest two possible sets of dates 
for calculating economic benefits associated with naval forward presence/crisis response: 
• The first set (Measure A) covers the period December 8 through the 21-from the 
first sign of a crisis to the time the crisis was resolved through naval action. The fact 
that oil markets were tranquil at the time suggests that this measure may be a slight 
underestimate of the benefits derived from naval action. 
• The second set (Measure B) covers the period December 16 through the 21-from 
the first sign that actual fighting might erupt to the time the crisis was resolved 
through naval action. Given some of the elevated price at this date was no doubt 
caused by the anticipation of a conflict, this measure overstates the economic benefits 
derived from naval action. 
Figure 17 












Using these intervals, a V AR forecasting model of the US economy was constructed. 
Statistical tests indicated that both the NYMEX spot market and the dollar/yen exchange rate 
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were significant in affecting the manner in which the crisis impacted US GDP. In the estimates 
below (Table 4), the oil impact was calculated first and a second set of calculations undertaken to 
see how movements in the dollar/yen rate by itself might have impacted on the economy. A final 
set of calculations combines the oil price movements with that of the dollar/yen rate. The result of 
this combination is not a simple additive amount as each may have negated the other during 
certain quarters. The final estimate does however provide a rough range of benefits associated 
with naval action during the period. 
V.5.2 Findings 
While the findings in Table 4 show benefits that are most likely in the range of three billion 
1995 dollars (Table 4, Model ill), there are some biases built into the analysis. For one thing, 
given data limitations, the impact of the operation can only be measured through 1999 thus no 
doubt biasing the results downward somewhat. 
The second problem is that one gets a somewhat different picture if just the oil price effect 
(NYMEX) is used versus using both the NYMEX and the dollar/yen exchange rate. The V AR 
Model analysis suggests that both variables should be used in the economic benefit calculations. 
However, no direct statistical link was found between events and the dollar/yen exchange rate 
while a strong one existed with the NYMEX. If one accepts the event analysis finding and leaves 
the dollar/yen rate out of the V AR then the benefits lie between 1.1 and 3.6 billion 1995 dollars, 
Table 4, Modell. A conservative estimate therefore phices the benefits at between 1.1 and 3.6 
billion (1995) dollars. 
V.6 Conclusions 
As with the Taiwan Strait case, the analysis has found strong stabilizing effects between 
naval actions and a number of key markets. There is a striking similarity to the two sets of results 
in that key naval actions provide a stimulus to share markets while retarding the upward 
movement in oil and commodity prices. As with the Taiwan strait case one can only interpret the 
results as suggesting that the markets look at naval forward presence and crisis response as a 
stabilizing force, providing security of supply and continued access to supplies. They are not 
viewed as ushering in a period of protracted instability and uncertainty. 
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Table 4 
Operation Desert Fox: 
Naval Crisis Response Impact on the United States Economy 
(Billions 1995 Dollars) 
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Notes: The statistical output of the ARDUerror correction analyses and V AR models on which 
these results are based are contained in a separate set of appendices available from the authors. 
Order of V AR = 2. 
Model I - Oil price effect examines just the impact of oil price changes on US GDP; Model II -
Yen effect assess the impact on US GDP due exclusively to movements in the Japanese Yen; and 
Model III - Combined oil/yen effect examines the simultaneous impact of oil price and yen 
changes on US GDP. 
Impact Measure A is derived by subtracting the US GDP estimated on the assumption of 
December 8 oil and dollar/yen forward prices from that estimated on the basis of December 21 
prices. 
Impact Measure B is derived by subtracting the US GDP estimated on the assumption of 
December 16 oil and dollar/yen forward prices from that estimated on the basis of December 21 
prices. 
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VI. Operation Attain Document I 
VI.I Overview 
This case, occurring through much of January 1986, is the first of four operations 
conducted off the coast of Libya that year, ending with Operation El Dorado Canyon, April 15, 
1986. 
VI.2 Timeline 
January 7, 1986 
President Reagan issues an executive order banning travel, trade, or other transactions with 
Libya. A February 1 st deadline is set for the withdrawal of 1,000 Americans ordered to leave as 
part of the US economic sanctions. 
January 13, 1986 
Two LAAF Mig-25's intercept an EA-3B 150 NM North of Libya. 
January 15, 1986 
The aircraft carriers USS Coral Sea and USS Saratoga arnve on station in the 
Mediterranean with 13 other US Navy ships. 
January 24, 1986 
Carrier operations begin in the central Mediterranean Sea. The New York Times 
(Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Starting Flights off Libya," New York Times, January 24, 
1986, p. 8) reported that the American Navy off Libya has informed Tripoli air controllers that 
planes from two aircraft carriers will be carrying out maneuvers for one week. Also, it was timed 
for the end of the mission to Western Europe by John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, 
who has been urging allies to take measures against Libya in response to the terrorist attacks on 
the Rome and Vienna airports on Dec. 27. The United States contends that the Abu Nidal group 
carried out the attacks, and that that group has received training and support from Libya. 
January 25, 1986 
Qaddafi declares 32 30N the "line of death" as he boards the PT boat Waheed to travel 
from Misratah to Bengazi along 32 30 N in defiance of scheduled US naval exercises to the 
North. New York Times (Judith Miller, "Qaddafi Says he has Called Full Alert," New York 
Times, January 25, 1986, p. 4) reports that the dollar fell to a seven-year low in Tokyo and 
declined in Europe after Japan's Finance Minister predicted that the currency would fall to the 
190-yen level. Gold prices surge in what traders called a reaction to the falling dollar and to 
uneasiness over American naval maneuvers off Libya's coast. Demand for gold tends to increase 
during times of political uncertainty . Navy carrier jets begin operations north of Libya, leaving t 
open the possibility that the Navy jets from the carriers Coral Sea and Saratoga might be ordered 
into airspace over the Gulf of Sidra, thereby risking a clash with Libyan forces. 
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January 26, 1986 
Operation Attain Document I begins north of 32 30. USS Saratoga and USS Coral Sea 
conduct flight operations in international waters to demonstrate US right to operate there. The 
New York Times (Judith Miller, Qaddafi Sails off to Confront U.S. Warships," New York Times, 
January 26, 1986, p. 1) reports mUltiple intercepts of LAAF aircraft north of 32° 30'N over the 
next four days. 
January 28, 1986 
New York Times (Bernard Gwertzman, State Dep. Official Warns Libyans (New York 
Times, January 28, 1986), p. 8) reports that NBC News had been informed by Pentagon officials 
that the Navy planned to move a vessel, probably the cruiser Yorktown, into the Gulf of Sidra. 
Other Pentagon officials, however, said the NBC News report was wrong. Also, a senior State 
Department official explicitly warned for the first time today that the Administration would 
consider military action against Libya if the nonmilitary sanctions already imposed by 
Washington fail to achieve results. Finally, many traders who bought late last week because of 
heightened tensions between the United States and Libya sold those positions. No direct 
confrontation occurred off the Libyan coast where the United States was staging naval 
maneuvers. 
January 29, 1986 
New York Times (Robert Suro, "Libya Makes Offer to Stem Terrorism," New York Times, 
January 29, 1986, p. 16) reports that Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi said that Col. Muammar 
el-Qaddafi had offered to help halt Arab terrorist operations in Europe if the United States 
promised not to attack Libya. The Italian Government said it received the Libyan leader's 
proposal this morning in a message from the Maltese Prime Minister, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, 
who has been trying to serve as an intermediary between Libya and Italy after apparently 
coordinated attacks on the airports here and in Vienna on Dec. 27. Additionally, A senior 
Administration official said the United States would make no bargain with Colonel Qaddafi, 
because there is no one here who would trust his word. 
January 30, 1986 
New York Times (Judith Miller, "Oil Officials are Said to Leave Libya," New York Times, 
January 30, 1986, p. 1) reports that about a dozen top managers of American oil companies have 
quietly left Libya in the last few days. Also, while the Libyan fields may be insignificant to 
Occidental Petroleum, it and the other American producers are crucial to Libya's economy, 
analysts said. Oil is Libya's only significant source of hard currency, and American companies 
are said to account for the production of between 350,000 and 450,000 of Libya's 1.2 million 
barrels of oil per day. 
January 31, 1986 
New York Times (Bernard Gwertzman, "US Oil Companies May be Exempted from Libya 
Curbs," New York Times, January 31, 1986, p. 1) reports that Washington is considering 
modifying the Libyan sanctions by giving American oil companies licenses to continue to receive 
some income from Libya. The licenses would prevent the Libyans from reaping a "windfall" 
from American companies. Crude oil and petroleum products were mixed in thin trading. 
Analysts said the markets were awaiting a meeting of a special committee of OPEC on Monday. 
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VI.3 Event Analysis 
The Libyan case was selected to gain some sense as to how markets at that time responded 
to news concerning the potential conflict between the United States and Libya. At this time, the 
NYMEX market was a relative newcomer to futures trading and forward contracts. As the 
previous cases have shown, NYMEX forward markets playa critical role in transmitting naval 
events into impacts on the United States economy. Has this been the case from the start, or have 
these markets grown in sophistication over time with regards to the manner in which traders 
interpret breaking news? 
As a first step, an event analysis of the early 1986 period was undertaken to determine if a 
valid statistical relationship existed between naval actions off the Libyan coast and the major oil, 
commodity, share and exchange rate markets. Specifically, at the time did these markets respond 
to news concerning naval actions and, if so, did they assume that a disruptive conflict would 
ensue? Or, instead, did they interpret naval actions as stabilizing the environment through 
providing increased security and certainty concerning availability and access? Alternatively, did 
the markets simply disregard naval events as having any particular significance? Using the time 
line for the Libyan operations in early January, the key events are coded to test these alternative 
views of naval forward presence and crisis response. 
As in the previous cases, the event analysis can be used to statistically test the validity of 
different hypotheses concerning the manner in which markets interpret naval actions. In the case 
at hand, EVENTA (see Appendix F) assumes that US naval actions cause increased uncertainty in 
the oil markets, resulting in price increases, with other events' signs determined by their likely 
impact on oil prices. A positive sign suggests the markets interpret the event as creating 
increased uncertainty and or possible disruption, and a negative sign is indicative of markets 
interpreting the event as reducing tension and or the chance of supply disruption. EVENTB 
assumes that US naval actions result in reduced uncertainty in the oil markets, resulting in price 
declines, with other events' signs determined by their likely impact on oil markets. EVENTC 
assumes that all events and activities are seen by the oil markets as creating instability and 
increased uncertainty. 
Using these three sets of event codes as independent variables the event analysis took the 
form of a cointegration/error correction regression. As noted in the Methodology section, this 
technique is ideal for the problem at hand because it focuses on the problem of identifying shocks 
to a system and the manner in which the system adjusts to those shocks. Specifically the analysis 
breaks down patterns over time into two components, a short-run impact and a longer-run 
adjustment whereby historical patterns are re-established. 
VI.3.t The NYMEX Crude Oil Market 
Assessing the NYMEX crude oil markets, the statistical analysis found the significance of 
EVENTB (but not EVENT A or EVENTC) across different sets of independent variables. This 
finding suggests that oil markets respond to US naval actions in a positive manner, assuming that 
these events will provide stability to oil transport routes, production and the like. The result is a 
lowering of the price of oil following the event. The statistically significant long-run adjustment 
or error correction term (ecm) suggests that in addition to the short-run impact of EVENTB on 
the oil market, naval actions set off an adjustment process that also occurs over time. This 
adjustment is proportional to the difference in price between the NYMEX and the Goldman Sachs 
commodity index (or the CRB Index) plus EVENTB. 
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Increases in the CRB reduce the size of the ecm term and, given that term's negative sign in 
the NYMEX equation, increased upward pressure on the NYMEX oil price over time to restore 
long-run equilibrium. The EVENTB term is a bit more complicated. Since the naval events in 
the EVENTB term have a negative sign, their increased activity would tend to reduce the size of 
the EVENTB variable itself. In tum, a lower EVENTB value in the ecm equation tends to 
increase the size of the ecm term in the NYMEX equation. Given the negative sign on the ecm, 
the net effect of increased naval activity would be to reduce oil prices over time. 
Summing up (Figure 18), there is a short-run oil price decline following naval events 
during this period. In addition naval events interact with oil markets over time to gradually bring 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDUerror correction analysis. See Figure 13 for a description 
of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
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VI.3.2 Other Event Effects on the NYMEX Oil Market 
A standard measure of risk in the oil markets is the premium paid for early delivery as 
reflected in the spread between the first and second contract. Of the three event measures, 
EVENTB (negative signs on the naval events) is clearly the superior determinant of this spread. 
Given the negative sign on the naval events in EVENTB, it is apparent that the movement of 
naval forces during this episode assured markets of stable conditions thus reducing the premium 
of the first over the second forward contract. 
Finally, the NYMEX market has historically been sensitive to unanticipated developments. 
As such, the daily rate often fluctuates widely depending on the market's perception of risk, 
availability and security of oil supplies.. Of the three event measures, EVENTB (negative signs 
on the naval events) is clearly the superior determinant of this spread. Given the negative sign on 
the naval events in EVENTB, it is apparent that the movement of naval forces during this episode 
assured markets of stable conditions thus reducing the magnitude of day-to-day movement of the 
spot rate. 
VI.3.3 New York Stock Exchange Composite Index 
The event analysis suggests that two event variables, EVENTB and EVENTC, affect the 
NYSE Composite Index (Figure 19). The t-statistics for EVENTC are slightly better suggesting 
that this fonnulation is the best for capturing the effects of the crisis on the stock market. Taking 
EVENTC literally, each event (positive or negative in tenns of oil prices) is interpreted by 
investors in a manner that ceteris paribus increases the index. In EVENTB the naval events have 
a negative sign, and given the negative sign on the EVENTB tenn, tend to stimulate increases in 
the index. Conversely EVENTC has a positive sign and the naval events in this fonnulation have 
a positive sign. The result is that in each depiction, naval events tend, everything else equal to 
provide a stimulus for the market. 
The negative sign of naval events in the EVENTB tenn together with that tenn's positive 
sign in the ecm suggest that naval events reduce the size of the ecm tenn. Given that ecm itself 
has a negative sign in the NYSE equation, naval events are seen as having a stimulating effect on 
the market during the period of adjustment following a crisis event shock. The same is true of 
naval events in the EVENTC tenn. Here naval events have a positive sign in the EVENTC 
series. Given that EVENTC has a negative sign in the ecm equation, naval events reduce the size 
of the ecm tenn and given that tenn's negative sign in the NYSE equation increase the value of 
the NYSE index during the period of adjustment following a shock. 
VI.3.4 The CRB Commodity Index 
The events surrounding the Libyan Operations of 1986 have a statistically significant link 
to the CRB Commodity Price Index (Figure 20). This relationship is best depicted by EVENTC 
(with all individual events having a positive sign). EVENTB also has several statistically 
significant links to the CRB. The negative sign on the EVENTC tenn suggests that naval events 
(along with other crisis events) tend to reduce the price of commodities. This is consistent with 
the near equivalent EVENTB, which has a positive sign in the CRB regression. Here the negative 
sign on naval events in EVENTB would also tend to lower the CRB Commodity index. 
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Figure 19 
Libyan Operations: Event Analysis of the NYSE Composite Index 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDLIerror correction analysis_ See Figure 13 for a description 
of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
The forces of adjustment controlled by the ecm term reinforce these patterns. Specifically, 
EVENTC has a positive sign in the ecm. Here increases in EVENTC reduce the size of the ecm 
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tenn. Given the negative sign on the ecm tenn in the CRB equation, naval events reduce the 
upward pressure on prices. Basically the same pattern occurs with the EVENTB tenn. This 
variable has a negative sign in the ecm. However, given the negative sign for naval events in the 
EVENTB tenn, increased naval activity (given the negative sign on the ecm tenn in the CRB 
price equation) tends to reduce the CRB Commodity Index. 
The effects of the event variables on the CRB differ from that found for the NYMEX and 
the NYSE in one important regard-there is a significant fall off in the statistical links as one 
moves past the last event, April 18, 1986 (the analysis covers the period to May 31, 1986). The 
statistical significance of the event variables in the NYSE and NYMEX did not vary much when 
the non-event period (April 19, 1986-May 31, 1986) was included in the analysis. This suggests 
that the adjustment period for the CRB Index is much shorter than for the NYSE or NYMEX. 
Figure 20 
Libyan Operations: Event Analysis of the CRB Commodities Index 
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Note: Based on results from the ARDUerror correction analysis. See Figure 13 for a description 
of the main linkages and their interpretation. 
VI.4 Economic Benefits 
Due to the study's time constraints, the calculation of economic benefits was confined to 
Operation Attain Document I. Clearly however, given the findings presented below, there is a 
good chance that additional benefits would have been discovered through a thorough analysis of 
operations Attain Document II, Attain Document III and El Dorado Canyon. 
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Key dates were as follows. 
January 15, 1986 
USS Coral Sea and USS Saratoga arrive on station in the Mediterranean with 13 other US 
Navy ships. 
January 16, 1986 
Economic impact reflected in a drop in the NYMEX spot oil price of $1.10 per barrel. 
January 20, 1986 
Equilibration in oil markets with first forward contract no longer at a premium over the 
second contract. 
January 24, 1986 
Carrier operations begin in the Central Mediterranean Ocean. 
January 26, 1986 
Operation Attain Document I begins north of 32 30. 
January 27, 1986 
Monday morning short-run oil price shock resulting from initiation of operations the day 
before. 
January 30, 1986 
Operation Attain Document I ends as task force departs. 
January 31, 1986 
Equilibrium in the oil markets with the first and second contracts equal in price. 
The event analysis suggests that during this period oil market prices declined following 
naval operations. Using this fact together with the forward rates (extending through the December 
1986 contract) several impacts that carry on through to the US economy are identified in Table 5. 
VI.4.1 Assumptions 
These events and movements in the oil markets suggest four possible measures for 
calculating the economic benefits associated with naval forward presence and actions. 
1. Initial Impact. This measure is the short-run drop in price on January 16 following the 
arrival of the Saratoga and Corral Sea on January 15. 
2. Equilibration in Oil Markets. This measure is the restoration of the second forward 
contract premium over the first contract on January 20. 
3. Second Impact. This measure is the start of carrier operations on January 24, at which 
time oil prices fell from $19.65 to $19.35 per barrel. 
4. Final equilibration in Oil Markets. This measure is the achievement of equality in the 
first and second forward contract on January 31. 
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VI.4.2 Findings 
The results of the economic benefit analysis (Table 5) show significant economic gains in 
real US GDP were derived from this operation. Taking the benefits in stages (initial and final 
equilibrium), a high low estimate (just looking at the impact in 1986 would have been 7.8 billion 
1995 dollars, while a high estimate (impact through 1987) would have been 13.5 billion 1995 
dollars. In cases such as this where the actual termination date of benefits is somewhat unclear, 
the low estimate is no doubt the safer of the two. 
VI.S Conclusions 
Besides providing one more example of the economic benefits produced by timely naval 
action from forward deployed forces, this case is important because it comes at a time when the 
NYMEX was in the early stages of introducing forward contracts. The results clearly show that 
the markets were sophisticated early-on in the sense that they reflected a rational, knowledgeable, 
interpretation of the key crisis events. There was no panic buying or excess speculation on the 
unfounded notion that a regional conflict would break out. Instead the markets logically assessed 
the naval actions and concluded that they would aid in maintaining stability in the region. 
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TableS 
Operation Attain Document I: 
Naval Forward Presence Impact on the United States Economy-Oil Price Effect 
(Billions 1995 Dollars) 
Initial Stage of Operation Final Stages of Operation 
Impact Equilibrium Impact Equilibrium 
(Jan 15/16) (Jan 15120) (Jan27/31) (Jan24/31) 
Period 
1986Q1 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 
1986Q2 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.4 
1986Q3 0.7 1.7 1.5 0.7 
1986Q4 0.8 1.8 1.9 1.0 
1987Q1 0.7 1.6 2.2 1.1 
1987Q2 0.5 1.2 1.8 0.9 
1987Q3 0.4 1.0 1.5 0.8 
1987Q4 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.6 
Impact Through 1986 2.3 5.6 4.9 2.2 
Impact Through 1987 4.2 10.1 6.7 3.4 
Notes: The statistical output of the ARDLlerror correction analyses and V AR models on which 
these results are based are contained in a separate set of appendices available from the authors. 
V AR=2. Variables in the V AR Model: Real Gross Domestic Product (USARGOPS). Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (USAINVTS). Investment in MachinerylEquipment (USAIMCHS). 
Investment in Construction (USAICONS). Government Final Consumption (USAGOVTX). 
Intercept (INTP). NYMEX Oil Prices (NYMEX). 
V AR: Optimality: SBC=2. AIC =2 
Initial stages of operation: Impact 15116 assesses the impact on US GOP by subtracting the US 
GDP estimated on the assumption of January 15 oil prices from that estimated on the basis of 
January 16 prices. Equilibrium assesses the impact on US GDP by subtracting the US GOP 
estimated on the basis of January 15 oil prices from that derived on the basis of January 20 oil 
prices 
Final stages of impact: Impact 27/31 assess the impact of US GDP by subtracting the US GDP 
estimated on the assumption of January 27 oil prices from that estimated on the basis of January 
31 prices. Equilibrium assesses the impact on US GDP by subtracting the US GOP estimated on 
the basis of January 24 oil prices from that estimated on the basis of January 31 prices. 
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VII. Globalization and Naval Forward Presence 
VII.1 Introduction 
When this study was undertaken, one objective was to integrate the quantitative findings of 
our analysis with the more qualitative approach to globalization undertaken by the National 
Defense University (NDV). As it turns out, the NDV study will not be released until the fall 
2000. We have not been able to obtain advanced copies or preliminary results. Still scattered 
accounts (Dicks, "Navy Leaders Call for Boost in Budget Topline," Defense Daily, June 21, 
2000) suggest that the findings of that effort are consistent with the ones presented here. In 
particular, a major conclusion of that study apparently will be that "the presence of Navy ships 
and personnel worldwide has a positive impact on trade and jobs at home." 
VII.2 Components of Globalization 
As usually defined, "globalization" means the process of making something worldwide in 
scope and application. It most commonly refers to the stunning increase in the number and variety 
of transnational transactions. The process of adapting to global conditions requires adjustments 
on the part of both producers and consumers. Specifically, globalization refers to the worldwide 
convergence of supply and demand. This convergence takes many forms: 
• Trade (goods, services) 
• Finance (banking, investment, foreign exchange, capital movements) 
• Communication (information, education, technology) 
• Governance (institutions, education, technology) 
• Culture (art, music, entertainment) and 
• Work and leisure (labor, migration, tourism). 
From a purely economic perspective, there are five main trends of importance. The first 
trend is the upsurge of trade and changing trade linkages. During the 1985-2000 period, 
supported by the proliferation of multilateral and regional trade initiatives, the ratio of world trade 
to GDP rose approximately three times faster than in the ten years prior and twice as fast as in the 
1960s. Developing countries increased their share of world trade from 23 percent in 1985 to over 
30 percent in 2000. They also deepened and diversified trade linkages. Inter-developing country 
trade increased from 31 percent of total developing country trade in 1985 to over 40 percent by 
2000. Between 1985 and 2000 the share of manufactured products in developing countries' 
exports increased from 47 percent to around 85 percent. A significant share of world trade is 
intra-firm and stimulated by FDI (foreign direct investment) as firms seek to reduce costs and tap 
new markets. 
The second trend is the integration of world capital markets. Developing countries are 
becoming increasingly integrated into the global financial system, following the liberalization of 
financial markets of recipient and source countries. Often with the aid of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), many developing countries have removed restrictions on payments for 
current account transactions, and lifted controls on cross-border financial flows, especially 
controls on foreign inflows. The good growth performance of some developing countries has 
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contributed to make emerging markets more attractive to investors from advanced countries 
wishing to diversify their portfolios. 
The third trend is the increased importance of private flows and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The magnitude of private flows now overwhelms official financing. Capital inflows more 
than doubled in relation to developing country GDP between the early 1980s and 2000, with 
private capital flows rising from an annual 0.5 to 1.0 percent of developing country GDP to over 
2 percent by 2000. Contributing to the rapid growth of FDI to developing countries in recent 
years has been the adoption of strong outward-oriented policies, including substantial 
improvements in their investment codes, embodying a shift from sovereign discretion to a free 
flow of FDI. FDI however has flowed massively towards only a few developing countries 
experiencing fast economic growth: for example during 1990-96 Asian countries received twice 
as much in percent of their GDP than African countries. Two thirds of all FDI during the last 
decade went to just eight developing countries, and half received almost none. 
The fourth trend is the advances in telecommunications and transport. The main factor 
behind globalization has been the increased ease and falling cost of communications-including 
transportation. The cost of phone calls has fallen by a factor of sixty since 1930 and air-
passenger miles per capita have increased 15 times in the last 20 years. The advent of faxes and a 
global computer network has brought fundamental changes in the ways businesses and 
governments operate. 
The fifth trend is the changes in the movement of labor. As the world becomes more 
interconnected, flows of people across national borders have increased, though they remain small, 
contributing to ease labor bottlenecks and transfer managerial know-how. The largest flows are 
between developing countries, but flows from developing to industrial countries have accelerated 
over the past two decades. In the future one can expect pressures for increased migration from 
developing countries, whereas developed countries will lower their demand for immigrant labor. 
Globalization is spreading at an uneven pace, but wherever it develops, it has important 
security implications. Clearly, in an economic sense it blurs national boundaries. Whether and to 
what extent it erodes the power of nation-states, even as it extends their sovereignty into new 
areas, is a controversial issue with strong arguments made pro and con. However, it clearly 
changes regional and international power relationships, shifts the mixture of interests at stake, and 
redefines long-standing alliances and conflicts. It will greatly influence the shape, content, and 
legitimacy of the future global security order (Strategic Assessment 1999, National Defense 
University, p. 19). 
During the Cold War, the US consciously pursued its own version of globalization. It 
sought to integrate and expand the democratic, market-oriented, western or pro-western 
community of nations, and was not afraid of using military force to achieve the goal of spreading 
democracy. This community-building strategy encompassed both security and economics. The 
security component created a Western alliance system anchored in containment, deterrence, and 
collective defense. The economic component established a cooperative, rules-based trading 
system that rejected protectionism and lowered trade and investment barriers. Both components 
encouraged the notion that cooperation serves national interests better than conflict. Both 
stimulated greater efficiency, which freed up military and economic resources for more 
productive investment. In the post-Cold War era, this dual policy of expanding economic and 
security cooperation remains the main US policy instrument for building a just, stable, and 
prosperous world order (Strategic Assessment 1999, National Defense University, pp 20-22). 
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It is generally felt that the United States is well positioned to compete in the global 
economy. Economic globalization is broadly consistent with US international security and foreign 
policy interests. It: 
• Facilitates integration 
• Promotes openness 
• Encourages institutional reforms 
• Increases efficiency 
• Accelerates the growth of US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
• Helps control domestic inflationary forces. 
VII.3 Globalization and the Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence 
Within the environment of deepening globalization, naval forward presence gives the US 
the ability to shape environments through the strategic positioning of people and equipment. The 
inherent mobility of naval forces provides the ability to rapidly project and concentrate military 
power worldwide, deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression. US naval forces receive an 
increasing share of crisis response missions because forward deployed naval forces will be the 
only timely option unconstrained by access agreements. 
Naval forward presence can be manifested in a number of ways, but the most common is 
the presence of a carrier battle group in an area of interest such as the Mediterranean Sea or the 
Persian Gulf. On average, 50 percent of the U.S. Navy's active fleet is underway on any given 
day, and more than a third is forward deployed. 
The United States is a maritime nation, and international ocean policy is important to 
Americans. Today, 95 percent of US foreign trade is transported by sea and it represents 20 
percent of the GDP (Strategic Assessment 1999, National Defense University, p. 308). In today's 
global economy, any interruption in free trade, caused by a military crisis for example, has a 
negative economic impact, and influences a nation's well being (not only in the troubled region 
but worldwide). Timely responses by external military forces can stabilize the situation and 
restore confidence and economic activity. In the economic sense, naval forward presence 
provides stability and security of free trade, and quick crisis responses. 
Economic benefits include the avoidance of losses GDP, reduced unemployment and 
inflation, expanded industrial production, etc. However, because the role of forward-deployed 
naval forces is primarily preventive in nature it is difficult to measure the full benefits derived 
from that activity. In effect, all quantitative measurements of benefits are by nature 
underestimates because we have no way of assessing the economic costs of the many crisis that 
were prevented simply because of the presence of naval forces. 
With this caveat in mind the findings of the present study of four specific instances of naval 
forward presence and crisis response suggests that both globalization and naval forward presence 
complement each other in creating an environment in which the United States economy is able to 
fare better than would be the case if either or both were absent. These effects and linkages are 
summarized in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 
Naval Forward Presence and Globalization: 
Complementarities and General Impact on the United States Economy 
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In particular the V AR forecasting models are based on the linkage from oil, exchange rate 
and share market shifts resulting from naval forward presence and crisis response to increased 
rates of investment and ultimately higher levels of GDP. While the details, role of exchange rates 
and share markets, may vary slightly from one case to another the basic mechanism is similar in 
all cases. On the globalization side of the equation (right hand column in Figure 22), a number of 
developments in the world market economy tend to reinforce the positive naval forward presence 
impact on the US economy. 
It is also clear that the process of globalization can only proceed in an environment 
characterized by stable, secure trading conditions, provided in large part by forward deployed 
naval forces. Specifically (Figure 23), more stable oil prices derived from naval crisis response 
induce greater trade through reducing some of the risks associated with unexpected increases in 
transport costs. The stronger more stable dollar associated with naval forward presence aids the 
development of stronger US share markets (foreign investors avoid much of the exchange risk 
associated with other markets). The increased value in share markets associated with naval 
forward presence also increases investment and ultimately economic growth. 
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Figure 23 
Naval Forward Presence and Globalization: 
Effect of Naval Forward Presence on the Components of Increased Globalization 
















While the results of the study suggest that naval forward presence and crisis response have 
a strong and positive impact on the US economy, some observers have argued that in the future 
these impacts are likely to be diminished. For example one might argue that oil accounts for a 
lower share of GDP (energy conservation, alternative fuels) so that the oil shocks that have 
disrupted the economy in the past are becoming less and less of a threat to prosperity. A corollary 
is that the so-called new economy is more of a service economy and much less dependent on 
energy and raw materials. Despite the fact that this is a commonly held view, it is not based on 
any real hard evidence. Our results suggest a fairly significant oil related impact on the US 
economy under a series of alternative environments. While the magnitudes of each case vary 
greatly, there is no apparent trend towards diminished effectiveness of forward deployed naval 
forces in stabilizing oil markets. Finally, several recent studies avoid the new economy 
arguments by contending that the recent expansion in the economy is due to a good oil shock 
(fairly long period of low oil prices). 
VII.4 Conclusions 
As for the future, it is likely that increased world trade (Figure 24) and increased 
economic growth associated with globalization will place a growing demand on oil supplies 
66 
creating the chance of more volatile oil shocks associated with crisis around the world. These 
developments rather than lower the impact of naval forces will actually enhance the chance of 
favorable interventions by forward deployed naval forces. Similar arguments can be made for 
likely changes in the share and foreign exchange markets. 
In sum, likely changes in the various facets should strengthen the economic impacts of 
naval forward presence and crisis response. In tum, the stability provided by naval forward 
presence should assure continued deepening of the globalization process. This would set up a 
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VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
As in the first study, all four new cases, Taiwan Strait incident and Operations Desert 
Strike, Desert Fox and Attain Document I, are shown to produce positive economic benefits for 
the United States economy. The mechanisms by which naval actions impacted on the economy 
are depicted in Figures 26 - 28. These benefits, measured in 1995 US dollars, are non-trivial with 
each operation yielding well over a billion dollars in terms of added GDP to the US economy. 
Also similar to the first study, the oil markets provide a consistent link between naval 
actions and the US economy. This occurred despite the fact that in one case, the Taiwan Strait 
incident of 1996, it was not apparent that oil markets would be affected. While oil markets are 
the one constant throughout the cases, several other markets are affected by naval actions. These 
include: the dollar/yen exchange rate, the CRB commodity index, the Goldman-Sachs 
Commodity Index, the S&P-lOO, the NIKKEI 100, the Hang-Seng, and the New York Stock 
Exchange Composite Index. 
More importantly, naval events have a positive effect at all times. In each case involving 
oil or commodity markets, naval events reduce the price from what it would have been in the 
absence of forward presence and crisis response. In the case of share markets and the dollar/yen 
exchange rate, prices were higher than they would have been in naval forces had not been present. 
In affecting these markets, naval actions are shown to produce a short-run (overnight effect) in 
the directions noted above. More importantly the analysis found that the impact of naval actions 
on these markets lingers for a significant time, altering prices for a period of time that allows for 
significant benefits to the US economy. 
With regard to globalization, it was argued that naval events complement the positive 
impact increased globalization has had on the US economy. In addition, it was argued that naval 
forward presence and crisis response tend to strengthen the process of globalization through 
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Impact of Naval Forward Presence in Operation Desert Strike (1996) 
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IX. Areas for Further Research 
Among other things, the current study has shown that the economic benefits associated 
with naval crisis response may be fairly widespread, occurring in non-oil as well as oil situations. 
Movements in naval forces during crisis periods often impact on a variety of markets in 
statistically significant ways. These movements often shock markets, initiating a follow-on 
equilibration process that tends to lower oil/commodity prices and raise the dollar and share 
market values. These movements are ultimately beneficial to the United States economy. The 
linkages between crisis response and markets tends to be complex with the initial impact 
spreading to related markets i.e., oil prices to exchange rates to share markets. The ultimate 
impact on the US economy as well as those of our allies is dependent on the strength and stability 
of these market linkages. In turn, these conditions are dependent on the environment created by 
the state of globalization and associated institutions. 
These generalizations can be a starting point in assessing future economic impacts 
associated with naval forward presence and crisis response. Still, with each finding several other 
questions arise. Why are, say, the benefits associated with Operation Desert Fox higher than 
those accruing from Desert Strike? Why are the benefits from the Taiwan Strait case rather high, 
despite the fact that no direct links to oil exist? Would they have been higherllower under 
different circumstances? Which circumstances? Can we predict, in advance, the general 
magnitude of economic benefits accruing from similar operations? What methods are best to do 
this? What factors need to be taken into account in making assessments of the impact of future 
naval actions? How might these change with the evolution of globalization and increased 
economic integration? Will likely changes in the international economic environment strengthen 
or weaken the positive economic impacts associated with naval forward presence and crisis 
response? Ultimately, what might the US have done before and concurrently to enhance these 
benefits? 
An issue often associated with globalization is the likelihood that the forces associated with 
the "New Economy" may modify the economic consequences of forward deployed naval forces. 
The defining characteristic of the new economy viewpoint is a focus on increasing globalization 
and expanding information technology as the underlying causes of an evolving economy. Here 
globalization and computerization are not viewed merely as symptoms of other factors but as the 
driving forces that are fundamentally changing the economy. On the surface this is surely true-
there is little debate that the world economy is becoming more consolidated in terms of both 
product and capital markets and that information technology is changing how business, people 
and markets interact. The real questions that need to be examined are whether these changes are 
new in a meaningful sense and whether they are powerful enough to truly change how the 
economy works and thus the economic impacts of naval forward presence and crisis response. If 
so, what is the manner in which these changes are likely to occur, and what are the resulting 
consequences for the US economy? 
73 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Taiwan Strait Crisis: Market Movements (Charts) 
Appendix B: Taiwan Strait Crisis: Event Scores (Tables) 
Appendix C: Operation Desert Strike Market Movements (Charts) 
Appendix D: Operation Desert Fox: Event Scores (Tables) 
Appendix E: Operation Desert Fox: Market Movements (Charts) 
Appendix F: Libyan Operations: Event Scores (Tables) 
Appendix G: Libyan Operations Market Movements (Charts) 
Appendix H: Notes on Maritime Insurance Rates 
Appendix I: Notes on Piracy 
Appendix J: Data Sources 
Appendix K: References 
74 
Appendix A 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: Market Movements 
Figure A-I 
Taiwan Crisis: 
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Figure A-4 
Taiwan Strait: Brent Markets 
Profiles of Future Prices 
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Figure A-6 
Taiwan Crisis: Oil Markets 
Spot/Forward Rate Patterns 
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FigureA-8 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: Movement in 
the·New York Stock Exchange Index 
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Taiwan Strait Crisis: Event Scores Assigned 
Event Analysis Variables 
Date EVENT3 EVENT3A EVENT3B EVENT3C 
12/01/95 0 0 0 0 
12/04/95 0 0 0 0 
12/05/95 0 0 0 0 
12/06/95 0 0 0 0 
12/07/95 0 0 0 0 
12/08/95 0 0 0 0 
12111/95 0 0 0 0 
12112/95 0 0 0 0 
12/13/95 0 0 0 0 
12114/95 0 0 0 0 
12115/95 0 0 0 0 
12118/95 0 0 0 0 
12119/95 
-2 2 2 2 12/20/95 0 0 0 0 12/21/95 0 0 0 0 12/22/95 0 0 0 0 
12/26/95 0 0 0 0 12/27/95 0 0 0 0 12/28/95 0 0 0 0 12/29/95 0 0 0 0 1/2/96 0 0 0 0 1/3/96 0 0 0 0 1/4/96 0 0 0 0 1/5/96 0 0 0 0 1/8/96 0 0 0 0 1/9/96 0 0 0 0 
1110/96 0 0 0 0 1111/96 0 0 0 0 1/12/96 0 0 0 0 
1115/96 0 0 0 0 
1116/96 0 0 0 0 
1117/96 0 0 0 0 
Notes: See case timeline for a listing of individual events by date. 
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Table B-2 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: Event Scores (contd) 
Date EVENT3 EVENT3A EVENT3B EVENT3C 
1118/96 0 0 0 0 
1119/96 0 0 0 0 
1122/96 0 0 0 0 
1123/96 3 3 3 3 
1124/96 -2 -2 -2 2 
1125/96 0 0 0 0 
1126/96 0 0 0 0 
1129/96 0 0 0 0 
1130/96 0 0 0 0 
1131/96 0 0 0 0 
2/1/96 0 0 0 0 
2/2/96 0 0 0 0 
2/5/96 0 0 0 0 
2/6/96 0 0 0 0 
2/7/96 0 0 0 0 
2/8/96 0 0 0 0 
2/9/96 3 3 3 3 
2/12/96 0 0 0 0 
2/13/96 0 0 0 0 
2114/96 0 0 0 0 
2115/96 0 0 0 0 
2/16/96 0 0 0 0 
2/19/96 0 0 0 0 
2120/96 0 0 0 0 
2/21196 0 0 0 0 
2/22/96 0 0 0 0 
2123/96 2 2 2 2 
2/26/96 0 0 0 0 
2127/96 0 0 0 0 
2/28/96 1 1 1 1 
2/29/96 0 0 0 0 
95 
Table B-3 
Taiwan Strait Crisis: Event Scores (contd) 
Date EVENT3 EVENT3A EVENT3B EVENT3C 
3/1/96 0 0 0 0 
3/4/96 0 0 0 0 
3/5/96 2 2 2 2 
3/6/96 0 0 0 0 
3/7/96 0 0 0 0 
3/8/96 3 3 3 3 
3/11/96 3 3 3 3 
3/12/96 2 2 2 2 
3/13/96 1 1 1 1 
3/14/96 2 2 2 2 
3/15/96 0 0 0 0 
3/18/96 1 1 1 1 
3/19/19 1 1 1 1 
3/20/96 0 0 0 0 
3/21/96 0 0 0 0 
3/22/96 -3 -3 3 3 
3/25/96 0 0 0 0 
3/26/96 -3 -3 -3 3 
3/27/96 0 0 0 0 
3/28/96 0 0 0 0 
3/29/96 0 0 0 0 
4/1/96 0 0 0 0 





Operation Desert Strike: Market Movements 
Figure C-l 
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AppendixD 
Operation Desert Fox: Assigned Event Scores 
TableD-l 
Event Analysis Variables 
Date EVENTA EVENTB 
10/1198 0 0 
10/2/98 0 0 
10/5/98 0 0 
10/6/98 0 0 
10/7/98 0 0 
10/8/98 0 0 
10/9/98 0 0 
10/12/98 0 0 
10/13/98 0 0 
10/14/98 0 0 
10/15/98 0 0 
10/16/98 0 0 
10/19/98 0 0 
10/20/98 0 0 
10121198 0 0 
10122/98 0 0 
10/23/98 0 0 
10126/98 0 0 
10127/98 0 0 
10/28/98 0 0 
10/29/98 0 0 
10/30/98 0 0 
1012/98 3 3 
10/3/98 0 0 
10/4/00 0 0 
11/4/98 1 1 
11/6/98 0 0 
1119/98 0 0 












































































Notes: See Desert Fox Timeline for a listing of the events. 
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TableD-3 
Event Analysis Variables (contd) 
Date EVENTA EVENTB 
12111198 0 0 
12114/98 0 0 
12115/98 0 0 
12116/98 0 0 
12117/98 3 -3 
12118/98 2 -2 
12/21198 -3 -3 
12/22/98 0 0 
12/23/98 0 0 
12/24/98 0 0 
12/28/98 0 0 
12/29198 0 0 
12/30198 0 0 
12/31198 0 0 
The main difference between the event scoring in EVENTA and EVENTB is that the naval 
actions are given a minus sign in EVENTB (naval actions reduce uncertainty, thus lowering the 
risk premium on oil prices) as opposed to the assigned positive signs in EVENTA (naval actions 
indicate potential for conflict and disruption of oil supplies). 
A number of events during Desert Fox occurred on the weekends. It was assumed here that the 









Listed as November 2 
Listed as November 16 
Listed as December 21 
Listed as December 21 
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AppendixE 
Operation Desert Fox: Market Movements 
FigureE-l 
Operation Desert Fox: 
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Libyan Operations (1986) 
Table F-1 
Assigned Event Analysis VaInes 
DATE EVENTA EVENTB EVENTC 
112/86 0 0 0 
113/86 0 0 0 
116/86 0 0 0 
1/7/86 1 -1 1 
1/8/86 0 0 0 
119/86 0 0 0 
1110/86 0 0 0 
1113/86 1 -1 1 
1114/86 0 0 0 
1115/86 2 -2 2 
1116/86 0 0 0 
1117/86 0 0 0 
1120/86 0 0 0 
1121186 0 0 0 
1122/86 0 0 0 
1123/86 0 0 0 
1124/86 2 -2 2 
1127/86 1 -1 1 
1128/86 -2 -2 2 
1129/86 -2 -2 2 
1130/86 1 -1 1 
1/31/86 -1 -1 1 
2/3/86 -1 -1 1 
2/4/86 0 0 0 
2/5/86 0 0 0 
2/6/86 0 0 0 
2/7/86 0 0 0 
2/10/86 0 0 0 
115 
Table F-2 
Assigned Event Analysis Variables 
DATE EVENTA EVENTB EVENTC 
2111186 -1 -1 1 
2/12/86 3 -3 3 
2/13/86 1 -1 1 
2114/86 1 -1 1 
2118/86 3 -3 3 
2119/86 0 0 0 
2120/86 0 0 0 
2121186 0 0 0 
2/24/86 0 0 0 
2/25/86 0 0 0 
2/26/86 0 0 0 
2/27/86 0 0 0 
2/28/86 0 0 0 
3/3/86 0 0 0 
3/4/86 0 0 0 
3/5/86 0 0 0 
3/6/86 0 0 0 
3/7/86 0 0 0 
3110/86 0 0 0 
3111186 0 0 0 
3112186 0 0 0 
3113/86 0 0 0 
3114/86 0 0 0 
3117/86 0 0 0 
3118/86 0 0 0 
3119/86 0 0 0 
3120/86 0 0 0 
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Table F-3 
Assigned Event Analysis Variables 
DATE EVENTA EVENTB EVENTC 
3/21186 0 0 0 





3/27/86 2 -2 2 
3/31186 0 0 0 
411/86 0 0 0 
412/86 0 0 0 
4/3/86 0 0 0 
4/4/86 0 0 0 
417186 2 2 2 
418/86 0 0 0 
4/9/86 2 1 2 
4/10/86 2 1 2 
4111186 1 
-1 1 
4114/86 2 0 2 




4117/86 0 0 0 
4118/86 0 0 0 
4121186 0 0 0 
4122186 0 0 0 
4123/86 0 0 0 
4/24/86 0 0 0 
4125186 0 0 0 
4/28/86 0 0 0 
4/29/86 0 0 0 
4/30/86 0 0 0 
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TableF-4 
Assigned Event Analysis Variables 
DATE EVENTA EVENTB EVENTC 
5/1/86 0 0 0 
5/2/86 0 0 0 
5/5/86 0 0 0 
5/6/86 0 0 0 
5/7/86 0 0 0 
5/8/86 0 0 0 
5/9/86 0 0 0 
5/12/86 0 0 0 
5/13/86 0 0 0 
5/14/86 0 0 0 
5/15/86 0 0 0 
5/16/86 0 0 0 
5/19/86 0 0 0 
5/20/86 0 0 0 
5/21/86 0 0 0 
5/22/86 0 0 0 
5/23/86 0 0 0 
5/27/86 0 0 0 
5/28/86 0 0 0 
5/29/86 0 0 0 
5/30/86 0 0 0 
Notes: See Libyan timeline for a listing of the events. EVENTA assumes that naval actions cause 
increased uncertainty in the oil markets resulting in price increases, with other events' signs 
determined by their likely impact on oil prices. EVENTB assumes that naval actions result in 
reduced uncertainty in the oil markets and price declines, with other events' signs determined by 
their likely impact on oil markets. EVENTC assumes that all events are interpreted by the oil 




Relevant Market Movements During the Libyan Operations (1986) 
Figure G-l 
Libyan Operations: Attain Document I 
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Notes on Maritime Insurance Rates 
This initiative was to see if commercial maritime insurance underwriters assess a 
war risk surcharge on vessels operating in or around areas of increased tension or 
conflict. If there is such a surcharge and if historical data on its magnitude, the vessels 
effected, and the dates for which the surcharge was applied could be obtained, we could 
then test hypotheses about whether naval actions have any impact on maritime insurance 
rates. 
Research was conducted to detennine if the maritime insurance industry alteres maritime 
insurance rates on commercial vessels when commercial vessels are expected to operate in areas 
considered by the maritime industry to be at increased risk .. Eventually, the identification of a 
War Risk Surcharge was provided by Ms. Kathy Brennan, Client Manager, Marsh Canada 
Limited. It was further detennined that the war risk surcharge (WRS) is set by the War Risk 
Rating Committee (WRRC) at the Institute of London Underwriters; However, questions 
concerning the WRRC and WRS addressed to Mr. Neil Smith, Secretary of the WWRC, have not 
been answered. The researcher also requested historical data on when the WRS was added to and 
eliminated from maritime insurance rates. Nine specific events that resulted in the presence of 
US naval forces were provided to Mr. Smith in order to detennine if a correlation between the US 
naval presence and WRS existed. The dates and events were: 
1. 18 Aug 1981 - 21 Aug 1981 (Libya) 
2. 13 Jan 1986 - 15 Apr 1986 (Libya) 
3. 1 Oct 1986 - 31 Mar 1987 (Tanker Wars, Persian Gulf) 
4. 1 Jul1990 - 31 Mar 1991 (Operation Desert Storm, Persian Gulf) 
5. 12 Jul 1994 - 15 Oct 1994 (Operation Restore Democracy, Haiti) 
6. 1 Sep 1994 - 30 Nov 1994 (Kuwaiti Border Incident) 
7. 1 May 1995 - 31 Dec 1996 (Taiwan Strait Crisis) 
8. 2 Sep 1996 - 3 Sep 1996 (Operation Desert Strike, Persian Gulf) 
9. 1 Sep 1998 - 31 Jan 1999 (Operation Desert Fox, Persian Gulf) 
No data has been provided by Mr. Smith (Neil Smith, Institute of London Underwriters, 
London England: e-mail: neil.srnith@lIoydsus.co.ukandlua@lua.e-market.net.uk; phone: 011-
44-171-327-3333). Thus, for the present study at least, it was not possible to detennine if naval 
crisis response has any impact on maritime shipping insurance rates. 
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APPENDIX I 
Notes on Piracy 
While the main thrust of the current study was focused on assessing the economic benefits 
derived from the four incidents of major naval action, the possibility of economic benefits derived 
from anti-piracy originating from forward deployed naval forces was also examined. 
Several masters theses at the Naval Postgraduate School have looked at one aspect or 
another of this issue. These theses are: 
• M. Farley, "International and Regional Trends in Maritime Piracy, 1989-1993," 
December 1993. 
• C. Cobb, "Combating Maritime Piracy," December 1994. 
• M. Lumpin, "Microviolence at Sea, 1975-1995: A Data Analysis," December 1995. 
• William Sutton, "Naval Special Warfare: A Long-Range View," pending 2000. 
While each thesis focuses on a different facet of piracy, they all convey the notion that anti-piracy 
may not be an area the United States Navy wants to become involved with. 
The logic is as follows. Pirates seem to avoid targeting US vessels because they know the 
US Navy will respond. Currently, piracy is not a problem in US territorial wasters. Attacks on US 
vessels overseas have only occurred in situations where the odds of success were heavily stacked 
in the pirate's favor. The regions with high incidents of piracy are those providing pirates with a 
quick escape route, allowing them to strike and then quickly melt back into the coastal 
population. 
One major impediment to the Navy being involved in anti-piracy are the issues surrounding 
sovereignty. International law dictates that each nation is expected to police its own territorial 
waters. 
Sovereignty aside, there is no doubt that the US navy could get involved in maritime anti-
piracy. The Navy's capability has been demonstrated repeatedly during the drug war. It seems to 
be more a question of should the U.S. Navy get involved? At this time the consensus (Oxford 
Analytica, "Problematic Piracy," April 5, 2000) appears to be that the costs are significa:ntly 
greater than any potential benefits to be derived from that activity. 
The other aspect of this is that the Asian countries themselves are coming to the realization 
that they must increase their own anti-piracy efforts. In an interesting development, Asian nations 
for the first time since World War II are considering a Japanese security role in the Region. Japan 
has proposed a regional coast guard to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, as 
well as in the South China Sea (Mark Valencia, "Joining Up with Japan to Patrol Asian Waters," 
International Herald Tribune, April 28, 2000). 
In promoting the anti-piracy program, Japan wants'to reassert its waning influence in the 
region as a counterbalance to China. Tokyo also sees the move as a way of delicately 
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distinguishing itself and its approach from that of the United States. As Valencia notes, the 
initiative can be viewed as part of a broader strategy developed at Japan's National Institute of 
Defense Studies. Such a strategy envisages a Japan-led international Ocean Peacekeeping Force, 
which would be primarily concerned with activities that are necessary to fulfill obligations under 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to maintain maritime order and prevent armed 
conflict at sea. 
Another solution (Indira Lakshmanan, "Trouble in South China Sea: Pirates Dodge Navy 
Gunboats to Steal, Kidnap and Melt Away," San Jose Mercury-News, September 10,2000) has 
been the entrance of private security companies. Sensing a niche, security companies have 
cropped up in Britain, the United States, Hong Kong, and Australia, providing former soldiers to 
defend ships and to search for and perhaps recover, missing vessels. The services are 




The data used in this study comes from three main sources: 
CRB Historical Data 
This source provided the raw data for the various markets used in the analysis. The spot data is 
daily while the future contracts are either monthly (oil) or quarterly (foreign exchange). The 
series used in the analysis included 
Oil 
NYMEX Oil (spot and future) 
Brent Oil (spot and future) 
Commodities 
CRB Commodity Index (spot and future) 
Goldman-Sachs Commodity Index (spot and future) 
Foreign Exchange 
Dollar Index (spot and future) 
DollarlYen Exchange Rate (spot and future) 
DollarlDeutsche Mark Rate (spot and future) 
DollarlBritish Pound Rate (spot and future) 
DollarlFrench Franc Rate (spot and future) 
Share Markets 
New York Stock Exchange Composite Index (daily) 
S&P-lOO Index (daily) 
FTSE-lOO Index (daily) 
Nikkei-225 Index (daily) 
Hang Seng Index (daily) 
OECD MEl Databases 
This is one of the standard sources of data on the United States economy. In this study we used 
primarily the macroeconomic series, which is recorded on a quarterly basis. Key series used were 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), various types of investment appearing in the National Accounts, 
and Government Consumption, also appearing in the National Accounts. These series are in 
constant 1995 prices. 
Events 
The events associated with each case were compiled from newspaper accounts of the period. 
They were obtained from LexuslNexus and were primarily from the New York Times, the Los 
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